

CHAPTER FOUR

GROWING CONTRADICTIONS

Apartheid had been implemented inside South Africa through an intricate series of laws and regulations carefully constructed to separate the races into a hierarchy of power with all groups subservient to white rule. Throughout the 1950s, the South African government had enacted legislation that controlled every aspect of its citizens' lives based on race. Members of each racial group were classified, told where to live, what schools to attend, whom to marry, and how much money they could earn at work. Despite its all-encompassing reach, however, the apartheid structure had been designed on an *ad hoc* basis in response to ongoing challenges from the African population. In this manner, apartheid also created some glaring contradictions and unintended results that threatened to destabilize the entire structure. By the 1960s, these contradictions began to emerge.

Many apartheid laws produced results that were counterproductive to the intentions of Nationalist politicians. African students, who were educated to believe that they deserved no more than a subservient position in South Africa, instead came to understand that apartheid left them nothing to lose in opposing the government by violent means. Employers found that there was no practical way to settle disputes with workers who were legally denied union representation or visible leadership. Africans who found themselves 'citizens' of their 'homelands' were too poor to buy the myriad products being produced at great rates of profit in South Africa's expanding industries. And all credible African leaders capable of exerting real leadership and control in the African community were in jail or dead. Rather than creating the well-ordered world of white supremacy foretold by apartheid's architects, South Africa's new legislation was creating a chaotic wreck of human waste.

The South African government turned increasingly to brute force and, in a desperately hypocritical move, even staged a mock 'reform' to blunt opposition. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the government imprisoned all of the country's most experienced African leaders, outlawed their organizations and prohibited all forms of protest against government policies. Public speeches,

newspapers, songs and even T-shirts critical of the government or in any way supportive of racial integration were illegal inside South Africa. The government tried to force an acceptance of apartheid. Nevertheless, the show of force only served to radicalize further opposition when Africans came to understand that there was no hope for them under apartheid. When the government offered a farcical constitutional 'reform' in 1983, African frustrations boiled over and signalled the beginning of unrelenting opposition that spelled the final downfall of apartheid.

THE IMPACT OF APARTHEID

While the government increasingly repressed the majority of its citizens, South Africa nevertheless saw a steady growth in its economy as foreign investors returned to the country, eager for the astounding profits that repression earned. Relying on extremely low wages, firms operating in South Africa earned profits averaging annually nearly 25 per cent by the early 1980s, as compared with rates of 6.5 per cent in Britain and 4.1 per cent in Germany. There were approximately 2,000–2,500 foreign businesses operating in South Africa by that time – including 1,200 British, 350 German and 340 American firms – investing about \$30 billion by the early 1980s and accounting for approximately 20 per cent of all industry in the country. The overall value of companies operating inside South Africa increased by an astounding 400 per cent in the 1970s. For the first time, Afrikaners began to partake of this wealth at something near the level of the English-speaking South African community with an annual per capita income of over 70 per cent that of the English, rising from less than 50 per cent in the prewar decades. The white community enjoyed a standard of living higher than that in most western industrialized countries.

But all of this wealth came at the expense of South Africans who were not part of the white community. Despite the overall increase in the economy, African wages did not rise. The real value of African mine wages was less in 1971 than it had been in 1911. And the African factory workers who were making South Africa's manufacturing sector its most productive earned only 18 per cent of the wages of their white co-workers. Overall, white per capita income was ten times that of Africans. By the early 1980s, South Africa ranked as the country with the most inequitable distribution of income in the world, with the bottom 40 per cent of the population earning only 6 per cent of national income. This gap between whites and other communities did not simply result in lowered standards of living, but also threatened lives. The mortality rate for African and Coloured infants was 13 times higher than for whites. As many as 25 per cent of African and Coloured children died before their first birthday.

THE FAILURE OF GRAND APARTHEID

The centrepiece of apartheid strategy was the belief that the complete separation of all races and ethnic groups would ensure stability and control. Nationalist politicians believed that Africans, Indians and Coloureds would come to accept conditions in their communities if their contact with white South Africa was limited. In Verwoerd's words, the African should not 'desire to become integrated into the life of the European community', but should understand that 'within his own community, all doors are open' (Huddleston, 1956: 159). To that end, all races should live in their own geographically defined areas, with whites holding most rural and urban space, Indians and Coloureds relegated to their own townships in urban areas, and Africans increasingly removed from urban townships and moved into ethnically defined 'homelands' in the rural areas. In this manner, contact between the races would be limited and groups would remain racially and ethnically defined and fragmented, discouraging multiracial organization or resistance.

Under the provisions of the Group Areas Act, urban and rural areas in South Africa were divided into zones, in which members of only one racial group could live. All others had to move. In practice, however, it was blacks who had to move, often under the threat or use of force. With the enactment of the Bantu Resettlement Act (No. 19) of 1954, the government began to remove Africans from the western Johannesburg suburbs of Sophiatown, Newclare and Martindale. The residents had been in the area since the beginning of the century and had acquired freehold rights from the original developer (who had hoped to sell to whites but the presence of a nearby sewage treatment plant had put them off). The government used the excuse that the process of removal was really only 'slum clearance' for the 'benefit' of the 'natives'. The government began to 'remove' residents physically, beginning on 10 February 1955, when 60,000 people were moved by army trucks and armed police from Sophiatown to an area set aside for Africans. One white observer described the manner in which Africans were moved:

It was a fantastic sight. In the yard [opposite the local bus station] military lorries were drawn up. Already they were piled high with the pathetic possessions which had come from the row of rooms in the background. A rusty kitchen stove; a few blackened pots and pans; a wicker chair; mattresses belching out their coir stuffing; bundles of heaven-knows-what; and people, soaked, all soaked to the skin by the drenching rain. (Huddleston, 1956: 179-80)

The Africans were moved out and replaced with white Afrikaners who renamed the suburb, Triomf, or 'triumph'. Sophiatown to Triomf was the first of the removals but the process was played out again and again throughout South Africa – the removal of Coloureds from District Six in Cape Town is probably the best known – as the government sought to give physical effect to its policy of separation, and whites seized the property of their black former

neighbours. The means remained much the same: forced ejection of people who protested against their removal, and the demolition and destruction of what little property they possessed. Twenty-five years after Sophiatown, here is how Africans who had lived in a rural area of northern Natal since 1885 described the implementation of apartheid:

On the 19th August 1980 we saw the Municipality and the Drakensberg Administration Board as well as police, all armed with guns, and a bulldozer. They started to break down houses. Most of the owners of these houses were not at home but at work or fetching wood. When they came home from work they found their houses broken down. (Platzky and Walker, 1985: 269)

During the three decades that the South African government pursued this policy, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, approximately 3.5 million Africans were removed from 'white' areas in a process the government came to refer to as 'erasing black spots'. In addition to the physical removal of entire communities, the very rigid application of pass laws doubled the number of Africans ejected from the cities between 1962 and 1967.

Where were Africans to go? To their 'homelands', areas originally defined by the colonial British government as African land and established as 'reserves' under the Natives' Land Act of 1913. Comprising 7 per cent of South Africa's land area in 1913, they were theoretically expanded to be equivalent to approximately 13.5 per cent in 1936 though the process of government purchase of the additional land was slow and incomplete. In the 1950s the government asserted that these lands corresponded with traditional African kingdoms and landholdings, although in most cases they were the areas left in African possession after conquest in the 1870s and 1880s and comprised mostly land deemed uneconomic for white habitation and cultivation. Of the ten homelands, only one (Qwaqwa) had contiguous borders while the rest consisted of scattered bits of unwanted territory (KwaZulu was made up of approximately 70 segments). The government established ten homelands, also referred to as Bantustans, based on ethnicity: Transkei, Ciskei (both Xhosa), Bophuthatswana (Tswana), Venda (Venda), Gazankulu (Tsonga), Lebowa (North Sotho), Qwaqwa (South Sotho), KwaZulu (Zulu), KaNgwane (Swazi) and KwaNdebele (Ndebele) (Map 2).

In 1959, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd announced government plans to grant them all 'independence' under the Bantu Self-Government Act and to relinquish responsibility for these territories and their inhabitants. To that end, the South African government had to assemble 'national' political institutions in each homeland. Following more than a century of conquest and white rule in most parts of South Africa, resurrecting chiefdoms seen as legitimate in African eyes in these areas was by all accounts suspect. Nevertheless, these representatives were then given powers of limited self-government in territorial legislatures. Finally, they were granted full 'independence' for their own affairs

by the South African government. In 1976 the government proclaimed the Transkei an independent nation-state and followed this move by granting independence to Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979, Ciskei in 1981. Citizens of these states, including the half who lived outside their borders, were then deemed aliens in South Africa. Another six ethnically based homelands were granted limited self-government in the 1980s in preparation for eventual independence: they were KwaZulu, Lebowa, Gazankulu, Qwaqwa, KaNgwane and KwaNdebele. None of these states received international recognition.

In this way, the government not only tried to dispel the appearance of political repression of its own citizens, but also cut financial costs associated with what it considered an 'unproductive' segment of the population. Fewer hospitals, schools, electricity lines, water supplies and so forth were needed inside 'white' South Africa. Africans were to live in their 'homelands', therefore it was unnecessary to provide them with amenities in the 'white' areas. Consequently, the government stopped building houses for Africans in urban areas (where they were not allowed to own property and were forced to live in townships designated under the Group Areas Act). In South Africa's capital, Pretoria, not a single house for an African family was constructed between 1967 and 1976. By the late 1970s there was, according to a government study, a housing backlog of 141,000 units (almost one-third of existing urban housing for Africans) and a shortage of 126,000 beds in workers' hostels (equal to 40 per cent of existing hostel accommodation). The average number of residents in a typical four-room home in Soweto at that time was 14. While apartheid success depended on African labour, government leaders still viewed Africans as visitors in South Africa who should be treated as transitory and disposable and afforded no rights or services in 'white' South Africa.

Since neither the proffered incentive of political participation in the homelands, the enforced disincentive of limited housing in the 'white' areas, nor even physical 'removal' seemed to be successful in keeping Africans out of the cities, the government simply decreed that they were no longer citizens of South Africa. Joseph Lelyveld, the *New York Times* correspondent in South Africa in the late 1970s, travelled throughout the country and described the process in action. 'Apartheid double bookkeeping, subtracting blacks every time there was an independence ceremony in a homeland, made this miracle possible. Who could have imagined that?' (Lelyveld, 1985: 122). The 'subtracted' citizens of South Africa showed up, either physically or statistically, in the apartheid homelands. Despite a high birthrate, the official number of blacks registered in the South African census regularly showed a decline throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1976 there were 18.5 million Africans; by 1977, the official estimates claimed, there were only 15.7 million. Between 1973 and 1982 there had been virtually no rise at all. In contrast, in 1970 the homeland of KwaNdebele had a population of 32,000; by 1980 it had,

according to official statistics, 465,000 'citizens'. This scenario was repeated throughout the country with the establishment of each homeland. In 1960, 39.8 per cent of total black population was in homelands; by 1980 resettlement led to 53.1 per cent in homelands. In absolute terms, the population in the homelands increased from 4.4 million to 11 million.

Although many Africans successfully evaded the move to the homelands, population densities in these outposts still rose to unacceptable limits. Whereas the 'white' areas in the Cape hosted a population of 2 per square kilometre, and in the Transvaal 11 per square kilometre, the corresponding figures for the homelands in 1980 were Bophuthatswana: 29, Lebowa: 65, KwaNdebele: 193, Transkei: 55, Ciskei: 82, and Qwaqwa: 298. Agricultural cultivation became impossible under such crowded conditions with deforestation and soil erosion quickly marking the landscapes of these semi-fertile areas. The results were disastrous. Even by South African government estimates, 80 per cent of the population in the homelands was living in poverty by 1983.

One of the most shocking examples of the crowded conditions obtaining in the homelands was in Qwaqwa, an intended national state that consisted of a quarter of a million people crushed into an area of only 25 square miles. When Joseph Lelyveld visited Qwaqwa in 1983 he tried to find a way to capture the experience:

For an hour or so, I experimented with taking pictures of these hillside settlements, hoping to get an image that conveyed the hivelike density of the place, but gave up in frustration. One picture of mud houses squeezed together in a barren landscape looked more or less like another. It wasn't the houses themselves that accounted for the overwhelming sense of abandonment and claustrophobia that you might expect to find in a refugee camp; it was the accumulation, the totality of them, with little in the way of a visible, supporting economy. It required a panoramic shot with a precise depth-of-field calculation, which was beyond my competence. And it required the immediate contrast of white South Africa, in all its plenitude and spaciousness, next door. How else could you make an image of exclusion? (Lelyveld, 1985: 138)

Although the homelands were economic disasters, what of their so-called political 'independence'? Situated within the borders of South Africa, they could either harbour Pretoria's enemies or remain under firm South African control. The South African government took few chances, installing leaders who would co-operate with Pretoria and provide no challenge to white rule in South Africa. Their national budgets relied heavily on assistance from Pretoria, and most security legislation (Internal Security Act, detentions, bannings, etc.) continued to operate until formal independence was granted. Some homeland leaders voiced opposition to the South African government but with little effect. Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, the government-appointed head of the KwaZulu homeland, successfully opposed accepting independence but at

the same time he encouraged Zulu nationalism, building up an ethnically oriented power base with his Inkatha Freedom Party.

In the Transkei and the Ciskei, familial dictatorships – the Matanzima brothers in the former, the Sebes in the latter – provided ‘indigenous’ leadership for regimes in which state power was exercised without even a veneer of respect for the rule of law. Lelyveld captured best the appearance of Lieutenant General Xhanti Charles Sebe, director of state security for the Ciskei: ‘a flamboyant black cop who sometimes wore a black Stetson with his smoked glasses and Christian Dior suits . . . [who had] a helicopter and a couple of planes at his disposal and also a fat-cat BMW sedan with frosted glass so that the assassins who were presumed to be lurking in wait for him could never know whether he was inside or where he was sitting’. Before becoming a general in the homeland security force, Sebe had been a sergeant in the South African police in which one of his last jobs had been to spy on Stephen Biko, founder of the Black Consciousness Movement, and his supporters. For Sebe the real enemy was communism and it took many forms: ‘in my context a liberal is a Communist’; ‘[t]he struggle in South Africa is not between a black struggle and a white. It is a communistic oriented ideology professed by the African National Congress for the Communists to take over in South Africa as it is stated in their blueprint’; ‘[y]ou [speaking to a group of Afrikaner students] all heard about Mandela. . . . You all heard about Moses Kotane, Alfred Nzo, Oliver Tambo, but because of *commu-u-nism*, where are they now with their brains, with their academic backgrounds?’ (Lelyveld, 1985: 158, 172–3, original emphasis).

But grinding poverty and political repression had enormous costs and not just for the victims of apartheid. By the end of the 1970s, the government began to acknowledge that the homelands were a failure. In 1979 the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilization of Manpower (Rieckert Commission) determined that poverty in the homelands was so crushing that tens of thousands of Africans were faced with no choice but to enter the cities, risking arrest and imprisonment, in order to survive. The government also admitted that ‘Grand Apartheid’ had equally grand costs. Moving Africans from their separate living areas, sometimes more than a hundred miles, to their urban workplaces on a daily basis required an enormous transportation network, primarily buses in which people were crushed for hours a day. With African wages kept low to benefit industry, the real cost of the transportation could not be charged completely against the commuters, with the result that the state by the late 1970s was subsidizing African bus passengers at the rate of \$1,000 per commuter per year. Lelyveld reported that the ‘KwaNdebele bus subsidy . . . was higher than the KwaNdebele gross domestic product. This is basic apartheid economics’ (Lelyveld, 1985: 122). While the government did not want to spend the money to build schools, hospitals or housing for urban Africans, it was also reluctant to continue subsidizing a

scheme that was not working. But it would be almost another decade before the government would publicly acknowledge this failure by rescinding the pass laws in 1987.

Too poor to sustain the African population and ignominiously discredited as corrupt regimes, the homelands represented the largest and most expensive failure of apartheid policies. Most importantly, they utterly failed to stem the tide of African urbanization with the number of Africans in the cities doubling by the 1980s. Through overcrowding and insufficient investment in basic economic infrastructure, the homelands offered Africans no alternative to employment in the white areas of South Africa. Moreover, the illegitimacy of homeland governments and leaders left Africans few alternatives to the political leadership of the ANC, Black Consciousness, and other groups staunchly opposed to any accommodation with apartheid.

ESSENTIAL WORKERS: THE FAILURE OF LABOUR CONTROL

The same Africans who travelled back and forth to the empty independence of the homelands were also the backbone of South Africa's economy and wielded more power at the urban workplace than in their homelands. South Africa's prosperity was inextricably linked with apartheid, a system that produced huge profits through the exploitation of the workers and in turn relied on those profits to implement exploitation often through the police force. Brutality towards workers was not new in South Africa, and had been a feature of the slave economy at the Cape in the seventeenth century and in the mining economy starting in the nineteenth century. In most cases, employers relied on the fact that workers had little recourse against ill treatment and in any case could easily be replaced if they proved too troublesome. By the middle of the twentieth century, however, the situation began to change. While workers in the mines or on farms might be replaced with little trouble, doing so in South Africa's burgeoning factories would incur considerable expense in retraining Africans and possibly halting production altogether. African workers were indispensable not only in the traditional mining and farming sectors, but also in the most productive sector of the South African economy, manufacturing.

White governments in southern Africa had always viewed Africans as labourers who should be closely controlled, and by 1948 a formidable network of laws governed African workers. They were barred from certain skilled work (Mines and Works Act, 1911) and could be found guilty of a criminal offence if they broke an employment contract (Native Labour Regulation Act, 1911). Africans were not included in the legal definition of 'employee' and therefore could not join legally registered unions. Nor could African unions be officially recognized in labour negotiations (Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924 and 1937). It was also illegal for African workers to engage in strike activity

(War Measure 145, 1942) (Horrell, 1978: 8, 265). If African workers had any grievances, they had no effective or legal means of expressing their concerns.

Under apartheid after 1948, elaborate controls were extended to all African workers to ensure that labour was still provided to white businesses in spite of the strict separation of races. Beginning in 1952 under the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, the government established 'labour bureaux' where unemployed African men between the ages of 16 and 64 were required to register with a local employment officer, much like the US Selective Service system for military registration (Horrell, 1978: 173-4). These bureaux were first established in areas designated under the Group Areas Act for whites, but additional bureaux were established in the African homelands in 1968 under Bantu Labour Regulations. The labour bureaux acted as a sort of clearing house for African labour, with African work seekers increasingly stuck in the homelands without legal means of entering the cities to find work, and at the mercy of the employment officers. The bureaux notified workers of employment opportunities and required them to sign a legally binding contract to take a job. If an African lost his job, the labour bureau in that locality required him to register for new work and gave him six weeks to find a job. At the end of that time, if still unemployed, he would be bussed out to his 'homeland'. At that point, he was forced to register again with the labour bureau in his homeland and could only re-enter white areas if he was assigned a job through the homeland labour bureau. It was illegal for employers to hire an African who was not registered with a local labour bureau and employers were required to sign an African employee's reference book, commonly known as their 'pass' book, monthly, as proof of their continued employment and therefore their right to stay in a 'white' area. The labour bureaux worked to funnel workers into specific areas and to ensure that no African resided in a white area without serving white economic interests.

African workers were also subject to strict control over what types of job they could take. While earlier legislation, especially the Mines and Works Act, 1911 and the Apprenticeship Act, 1922, excluded Africans from employment in most 'skilled' industrial jobs, apartheid legislation began in 1956 to 'reserve' specific jobs for specific racial groups. By that time, increasing mechanization in factories had created new semi-skilled jobs into which Africans were being placed at rates of pay that white workers would not accept. The white labour unions argued that these rates of pay were too low to provide for a 'civilized' standard of living. In such a case, the white workers could ask the employer to raise the rates of pay or, if such action failed, the workers could request an investigation by a government-appointed Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956. The Tribunal could recommend that a 'Job Reservation Determination' be made by the minister of labour, legally reserving stated types of work to a specified racial group. The minister of native affairs could also exercise a type of job reservation by refusing to

register labour contracts for specific types of work in specific areas, such as prohibiting Africans from working as managers in stores in white areas (Group Areas Act, 1950 and Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1970).

All avenues of African representation were effectively closed. The government moved to deny Africans access to any union representation by continuing to exclude them from the legal definition of employee (Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act, 1955), and by barring any mixed race unions from being legally registered (Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956). It therefore became impossible for African, Coloured or Indian workers to make any legal representations through many of the white-led unions that had been sympathetic and had tried for years to represent their concerns. Instead, the government established a completely separate process and set of institutions for the resolution of African workers' complaints (Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act, 1955). At the top of this structure was the government-appointed Bantu Labour Board and Bantu Labour Officers. At the factory level, 'works committees' were established to deal with the conditions of employment in each establishment. Nevertheless, Africans still had no access to industry-wide organizations and the works committees were ineffective and largely non-existent.

By the 1970s, this system began to break down under the pressure of worker discontent. Economic recession in the early part of that decade, followed by inflation and a contraction in the job market, resulted in a dramatic upsurge in labour unrest. With over 165,000 African industrial workers, Durban became the focus of this unrest. In January 1973, a prolonged series of illegal strikes there began at a brickworks employing 2,000. The men went on strike arguing for higher wages, marching down the street chanting 'Man is dead, but his spirit lives'. When the brickworkers won a wage increase, strikes immediately spread throughout Durban to textile factories notorious for low wages and poor conditions, and moved on 'like a wave. As one factory won a wage increase and returned to work, another group of workers would come out on strike' (MacShane et al., 1984: 21). In the first three months of 1973, some 160 strikes involving more than 60,000 industrial workers took place, mostly in Durban but also spreading to the Eastern Cape and the Rand.

In addition to the high level of participation they engendered, the strikes were also significant in bringing about new and more successful organizing methods for Africans with no rights of representation and under heavy police surveillance. The workers engaged in sudden 'wildcat' strikes rather than the protracted negotiations used by African workers in the 1940s. In this way, employers and police had little time in which to take preventive and repressive measures. And the workers went a step further by choosing not to form representative bodies or to elect a leadership, learning from previous decades of labour and political protests that police would move quickly to arrest and jail any person who organized a strike. This was especially frustrating for

employers who found themselves faced with the prospect of negotiating 'with 1,500 workers on a football field' rather than with credible leaders presenting workers' demands in order to keep their factories running (MacShane et al., 1984: 51). Once again, apartheid had created its own contradictions by making it impossible to control workers through outright repression.

Under pressure from workers and employers alike, the government began to allow for some legal worker representation. In July 1973, the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act for the first time granted Africans direct legal rights in wage negotiations. Africans, rather than their white representatives, could represent their own interests at the industrial councils, conciliation and wage boards that determined their conditions of employment. Strikes by African workers were also legalized, and a system for organization within the factories through elected committees was also created. By 1976, nearly 3,000 such committees had been formed. Although the Act stopped short of allowing for industry-wide African unions, it was an acknowledgement by the government that the economy could not exist without the co-operation of African workers.

Nevertheless, the political and economic situation in South Africa continued to worry employers. The strikes brought working conditions in the factories to the attention of the world since many of the businesses operating in Durban and the Eastern Cape were owned by international firms. World-wide criticism began to mount through the 1970s and 1980s with successful calls for disinvestment in South Africa. Pressured by investors and worried about the continuing stability of the South African economy, companies began to re-examine their operations in South Africa. Those who stayed were faced with a growing labour shortage in the country's factories. During the 1960s, the number of jobs in manufacturing had grown by nearly 70 per cent as compared with only 10 per cent in mining and negative growth in farming jobs. The very workers who were threatening apartheid's control of the economy were in high demand in the factories. Employers could not afford high turnovers or dissatisfaction within this labour force.

When tensions inside South Africa erupted in student demonstrations in Soweto in 1976 (see below), employers became even more concerned. Most of the student political groups involved in the demonstrations, including Stephen Biko's Black Consciousness Movement, had close ties with workers and the labour union movement. The political groups had worked with the incipient unions throughout the 1970s, helping to organize community self-help efforts. And workers themselves had increasingly argued for the connection between economic and political disadvantage in South Africa. With the outbreak of country-wide community protests in 1976, employers feared the worst in their factories.

In order to forestall the politicization of the workforce and the union movement, the government appointed in 1977 a Commission of Inquiry into

Labour Legislation (known as the Wiehahn Commission). The Commission report was published in 1979 and opened with the admission that '[t]here were simply not enough [white] skilled workers available to fill all the vacancies [in manufacturing] . . . with the result that increasing numbers of unskilled and skilled workers, particularly Blacks, had to be trained and utilised to perform higher-level skilled jobs' (Price, 1991: 30–1). Under such circumstances, employers needed legally recognized workers' representatives with whom to bargain, and the Commission recommended that blacks should be allowed to register trade unions and to have them recognized as part of the official conciliation process. The Commission also recommended the elimination of statutory job reservation by race that had restricted Africans from higher paid and more skilled jobs, although it left it up to individual firms as to whether they wanted to practise segregation in the workplace.

Legislation incorporating the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission was passed in 1979 (Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979, permitting Africans to form trade unions, Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1981, permitting the formation of trade unions with a mixed membership, that is Africans, Coloureds, Indians and whites could be in the same union) and resulted in a surge of strikes and a huge growth in African trade unionism in the early 1980s. Whereas an annual average of 2,000 African workers had gone on strike in the 1960s and nearly 100,000 in the turbulent conditions of 1973, throughout the early 1980s nearly 90,000 Africans were out on strike each year. By 1984, 550,000 Africans were members of organized trade unions. The impact of union activities was apparent as the earnings of African workers began to increase with African wages as a percentage of whites' doubling in the manufacturing industries and more than tripling in the mining sector.

In addition to working towards improving life in the factories, the new unions also became increasingly involved in larger community issues. The impact of apartheid on African workers reached far beyond the workplace, and unionists became involved in establishing 'civic' organizations calling for better housing, health care and political rights. These workers would eventually join with an energized student movement to help force political change in the 1980s.

BANTU EDUCATION AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS

By the 1970s, Bantu Education had been in operation for nearly 20 years and had produced its first generation of African students. Educated to understand their 'place' within South African society – with no rights, privileges or opportunities – the Bantu Education generation envisioned by Verwoerd should have docilely taken its place as the servant of the whites and never have dreamed of any other life. However, Bantu Education backfired badly with a new generation that saw the naked truth: apartheid held no benefits for them

and they were being 'brainwashed' into thinking that they were inferior, lesser human beings. Stephen Biko would articulate the response of this generation with his political philosophy of 'Black Consciousness'.

The frustrations of youths growing up under apartheid were most intensely crystallized in the school systems. Most African students were in the urban areas since the government had decided to expand the number of African schools there, in spite of the homeland scheme, because of the increasing shortage of labour in the cities. Elementary and secondary school black enrolment rose from 1 million in 1955 to 2.5 million in 1969, and the black university population went from 515 in 1961 to 3,000 in 1972. During the same period, the amount of GDP spent on black education steadily declined, resulting in massive overcrowding in the schools. From 1970 to 1975, African high school enrolment grew by 160 per cent. In 1975, half of Soweto's population was under the age of 25, and there were 16,000 families for every high school compared to 1,300 families for every white high school. At Morris Isaacson High in Soweto, there were 70 students in each classroom.

By 1969, African university students were especially frustrated with their deteriorating situation and broke away from the multiracial National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) to form their own group, the South African Students' Organization (SASO). Objecting to the fact that the avowedly anti-apartheid NUSAS still adhered to apartheid laws in its daily practice (by, for example, requiring that black and white students occupy segregated dormitories at its national convention), the founder of SASO, Stephen Bantu Biko, argued that blacks should take matters into their own hands. First, they needed their own representative organizations: 'Blacks should work themselves into a powerful group so as to go forth and stake their rightful claim in the open society rather than to exercise that power in some obscure part of the Kalahari.' Second, they could not rely on whites, no matter how well meaning, as allies in the struggle against apartheid: 'White liberals vacillate between the two worlds [of black and white] verbalising all the complaints of the blacks beautifully while skilfully extracting what suits them from the exclusive pool of white privileges.' Third, blacks had to remake themselves psychologically: 'as long as blacks are suffering from an inferiority complex – a result of 300 years of deliberate oppression, denigration and derision. . . . What is necessary . . . is a very strong grass-roots build-up of black consciousness such that blacks can learn to assert themselves and stake their rightful claim' (Biko, 1986: 15–16, 21).

Stephen Biko, born in 1946, had received his elementary and high school education in missionary-run institutions, and then experienced the full ramifications of 'Bantu Education' when in 1965 he entered the 'Non-European' section of the medical school at the otherwise all-white University of Natal. He was strongly influenced by the writings of earlier ANC activist Anton Lembede and by the Black Power movement in the United States. In developing

the major tenets of Black Consciousness he defined 'blacks' as including people from all racial groups denied basic civil rights under apartheid, including Africans, Coloureds and Asians. In bringing about change, he stressed the need for 'blacks' to free themselves first from their psychological chains and then to work together for liberation. He did, however, reject the policies of violence adopted by the ANC and the PAC in the early 1960s and emphasized that only non-violent methods should be used in the struggle against apartheid [*Doc. 4*].

Although government officials at first welcomed the development of Black Consciousness because they mistakenly believed that the philosophy complemented the racial separation inherent in apartheid, they quickly learned that Black Consciousness was not meant to restrict Africans to their homelands. In 1972, SASO organized strikes on university campuses, resulting in the arrest of more than 600 students. In 1974, SASO and the Black People's Convention organized rallies to celebrate the overthrow of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique. The students made clear the connection that they saw between the end of colonialism in these neighbouring countries and the fight against apartheid, brandishing posters and banners saying:

Frelimo fought and regained our soil, our dignity. It is a story. Change the name and the story applies to you. The dignity of the Black Man has been restored in Mozambique and so shall it be here. Black must rule. We shall drive them to the sea. Long live Azania. Revolution!! [Samora] Machel will help! Away with Vorster Ban! We are for Afro black Power!!! Viva Frelimo. Power!!! We shall overcome. (Price, 1991: 52)

But the government responded with a predictable combination of repression and intimidation. Biko himself was banned in 1973 after strikes that year, and he was arrested and charged with fomenting terrorism following the pro-Frelimo rallies. By 1975, SASO was banned on all black campuses. The message of Black Consciousness was not silenced, however, as Biko used his trial – as had Nelson Mandela ten years earlier – as a platform to explain his message to South Africa and to the world. Biko's trial dragged on for most of 1975 and 1976 and during his testimony he explained the problems for Africans in South Africa:

I think the black man is subjected to two forces in this country. He is first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalised machinery, through laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through poor pay, through very difficult living conditions, through poor education, these are all external to him, and secondly, and this we regard as the most important, the black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation, he rejects himself, precisely because he attaches the meaning white to all that is good, in other words he associates good and he equates good with white. This arises out of his living and it arises out of his development from childhood. (Biko, 1986: 100)

The sheer arrogance and brutality of apartheid made clear to all blacks that under this system they had no worth and no hope, and this left them with two choices: submit or rebel.

Apartheid, in the form of Bantu Education, again failed in its primary aim. While the government planned to educate Africans to submission, it instead witnessed the beginning of apartheid's final downfall with student demonstrations in Soweto. The situation in Soweto began in 1974 when the newly appointed minister of Bantu Education, Michael C. Botha, and his deputy, Andries Treurnicht, decided to enforce a previously ignored provision of the Bantu Education Act that required Afrikaans to be used on an equal basis with English as a medium of instruction. A shortage of Afrikaans-speaking teachers and a lack of suitable textbooks had resulted in English and African languages being used as the languages of instruction. Because Afrikaans was identified by Africans, especially by the young and by those sympathetic to Black Consciousness, as the language of the oppressor, opposition to this new policy grew throughout 1975 and into 1976. Some African school boards refused to enforce the policy and saw their members dismissed by the government. Students began to boycott classes. On 16 June 1976, hundreds of high-school students in Soweto, the African township south-west of Johannesburg, marched to Morris Isaacson High School and then towards Orlando Stadium (the main soccer venue) where they planned to protest against having to use Afrikaans.

As news of the protests spread, police began to converge on Soweto, shooting at school children and throwing tear gas. By 9 am on the morning of 16 June, chaos began to sweep through the township. The first victim was Hector Petersen, a 13-year-old protestor shot by the police and who died on the way to hospital. As different groups of students came together and learned what was happening, they were shocked and then outraged. The police responded with tear gas and then with gunfire that left at least three dead and a dozen injured. The demonstrators, joined by angry crowds of Soweto residents, reacted by attacking and burning down government buildings, including administrative offices and beer halls [*Doc. 5*].

The next day, the government closed down the schools and put the South African military on alert. The deputy minister of Bantu affairs, Andries Treurnicht (nicknamed 'Dr No'), announced: 'In the white areas of South Africa [including Soweto], where the government erects the buildings, grants the subsidies and pays the teachers, it is our right to decide on language policy.' The minister of justice, Jimmy Kruger, accused the students of being communists: 'Why do they walk with upraised fists? Surely this is the sign of the Communist Party?' And Prime Minister John Vorster announced: 'The government will not be intimidated. Orders have been given to maintain order at all costs.' Those costs would include the lives of 174 Africans and two whites who were killed that day, as well as hundreds more who would be killed in the following months. News of the shootings swept around the world and the

South African economy began to feel the shock with both gold and diamond shares dropping. Nevertheless, the South African government was prepared to deal with protests as it always had, with extreme force and repression.

The radicalization of African youth evident in the violence that began in Soweto reverberated within the black community. Parents who had seen their children take to the streets, risking and sometimes losing their lives, were stirred to action. Throughout the urban African townships, parents began to organize new political groups for the first time since the Defiance Campaign of the 1950s. Over the next year, the 'Committee of 10', formed in Soweto, worked on a plan to remedy African grievances. In July 1977, the Committee issued a programme for the election of a new community board to have total autonomy in Soweto, including the power to levy taxes and to control education, the police and local elections. The plan was widely supported within the African community, including youth and parents. The minister of justice rejected the programme out of hand, and the government remained committed to controlling all African townships through the Bantu Administration Board. Immediately following the government announcement, unrest in African townships, especially those near Johannesburg and Pretoria, erupted.

THE APARTHEID POLICE STATE

To argue that apartheid failed in many of its primary goals – control over workers, complete separation of races, submission of youth – is not to say that apartheid did not wreak terrible destruction in the African, Coloured and Indian communities. Once the government began to realize that Africans would not automatically follow the dictates of the apartheid legislation of the 1950s, harsher and even more repressive state powers were established to force Africans into acquiescence. If African resistance could not be combated through separation, education or impoverishment, then the government would simply kill or imprison anyone who spoke out.

Throughout the 1960s, the government had steadily increased the police powers of the state in response to African challenges at Sharpeville and from the ANC and its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. These organizations had all been outlawed under the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1960, and all of their leaders 'banned' under the Suppression of Communism Act. In 1963 the General Laws Amendment Act enabled the government to institute the 90-day, later extended to 180-day, detention of individuals without charge, trial or legal representation. In the same year, the notorious 'Sobukwe Clause' was also inserted in the same Act, allowing the minister of justice to extend detention past the prison term handed down by the courts of anyone convicted under the Suppression of Communism Act (Robert Sobukwe was the only person ever held under this clause). The Terrorism Act of 1967 further expanded upon the types of activity that could be deemed dangerous to public

safety, including any action that could encourage resistance to the government, causing a disturbance, furthering any political aim, or causing feelings of hostility between races. Although similar to the Suppression of Communism Act, the Terrorism Act dropped any reference to ideology and allowed for the imposition of the death penalty for those found guilty.

In addition to the increasing web of legal restrictions placed on Africans, the government was also busy constructing an elaborate apparatus of state security organizations to monitor resistance. Beginning in 1963, the government decided to establish a number of bodies – many secret – to co-ordinate security and intelligence matters. In that year, the State Security Committee was established to consider these issues. In 1969 the government formally established the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) to co-ordinate and complement the security activities of the Security Branch of the police and the military intelligence division of the Defence Force. It reported to the prime minister and its activities remained secret. In 1972, the State Security Council (SSC) was established to advise the prime minister on the formulation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the country. Members of the SSC included the prime minister (later the president), the ministers of defence, justice, police and foreign affairs, as well as intelligence officials. By this time, the state had the intelligence network to uncover resistance and the legal tools to prosecute all who opposed the state.

These weapons would be used with great brutality following the Soweto uprising. Within the year, a total of 21 Africans died while being held in police custody. Many more had been tortured while imprisoned [*Doc. 6*]. All public gatherings had been banned throughout the country. By May 1977, the South African Institute of Race Relations reported that 617 Africans had died by violence since June 1976 in the townships. In an effort to appear to be making some moves towards reform, the government announced in August 1977 plans to write a new constitution, including limited representation for Asians and Coloureds, but not for Africans. Violent unrest continued in over 70 African townships throughout the country.

Mounting criticism and pressure on the government came to a head following the death in detention of Stephen Biko in September 1977. He had been held in indefinite detention and died from massive head injuries sustained during police interrogation. His public notoriety raised this incident to a level of national and international interest despite the fact that such deaths were being repeated in many South African jails. An inquest was held into the death and the police supplied the following official explanation:

Maj. Snyman reports that on 7/9/77 at about 07:00 he and [officers] Siebert and Beneke at the security offices in Sanlam offices interrogated Stephen Bantu Biko. The detainee was extremely arrogant, went berserk, took one of the chairs in the office and threw it at Snyman. With his fists he then stormed at the other members and the other members overwhelmed him. After a violent struggle, he fell

with his head against the wall and with his body on the floor and in this process he received injuries on the lip and body. Warrant-Officer Beneke received an elbow injury and nonetheless did not go off duty. The district surgeon was informed and visited the detainee. (Official notation from the police record book)

The officer in charge of Biko's interrogation, Major Harold Snyman, 20 years after the event, told in his testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) how the 'official version' of Biko's death was fashioned.

The instruction from Col. Goosen [Snyman's superior] to all the members of the security branch who had been involved with Biko; the Saturday after his death, he called all of these members into his office. . . . During this meeting Col. Goosen explained that the death of Biko was a great embarrassment to the security branch and the South African Government or could be a great embarrassment. It was clear that this event would have a negative impact on the image of South Africa abroad and that perhaps this could lose foreign investments for the country. . . . Col. Goosen explained that it was in the interest of the Government of the day that the matter had to be managed in such a way that the interests of the security branch and the South African Government could be protected. During this meeting there were instructions for everyone involved that the true facts with regard to this incident had to be adapted or simply not mentioned. (<http://www.doj.gov.za/anntrans/pe1/snyman.htm>) [Doc. 7]

The circumstances surrounding the death of Stephen Biko became a flashpoint for continuing resistance as well as increasing international attention to the brutal implementation of control in apartheid South Africa. The United Nations and the US government expressed concern over the circumstances of his death and the US Congress proposed that an international group examine South African laws and practices relating to detention and in particular the death of Stephen Biko. The South African government responded with a massive spate of bannings and detentions. On 19 October 1977, the government declared 18 organizations unlawful, arrested over 70 African leaders (including eight of the Soweto 'Committee of 10'), placed a number of people under banning orders, and closed down newspapers critical of the government. The minister of justice, Jimmy Kruger, who had already gained international notoriety by stating publicly that Biko's death had left him cold, justified these measures by declaring that the organizations and individuals affected were a threat to 'law and order'.

THE TOTAL STRATEGY

However, it was apparent by the end of the 1970s that neither the implementation of apartheid nor police intimidation was successful in halting continuing resistance and unrest within South Africa. The contradictions inherent in a system that depended on the submission of the overwhelming

majority of the population had become glaring with African workers, students and parents ready to risk their lives to challenge the state. Moreover, through widely reported events such as the Soweto uprising, the killing of Biko, and the violence in the townships, the world outside South Africa had become increasingly aware that apartheid was an inhumane system and anomalous in a world in which the last white-ruled colonial regimes of Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia had all fallen and been replaced by black-majority governments committed to freeing their African compatriots to the south.

Until the 1970s, apartheid was only one variant of continued colonial rule under white settler populations in Africa and elsewhere. By the end of that decade, however, South Africa stood alone and most significantly had no remaining white-ruled neighbours to secure the country's borders. Botswana and Lesotho had achieved independence in 1966, Swaziland in 1968, though they remained surrounded by white-ruled areas and their economies continued to be dependent on that of South Africa. In 1972, Africans in Rhodesia began a full-scale guerrilla war against the renegade white minority Smith regime that was attempting to perpetuate white settler rule. By 1978 the war covered 80 per cent of the Rhodesian countryside and all whites lived in a state of military siege. Although supported covertly by police and soldiers from South Africa, the settlers were forced to the negotiating table and capitulated in 1980, but not without ensuring that the lands confiscated from Africans during conquest in the early part of the century remained in the ownership of white farmers. Things fared worse for white settlers in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique when the government of premier Marcello Caetano in Portugal was overthrown in 1974 and the Portuguese military withdrew from all colonies. White settlers fled to South Africa and to Portugal, while both Angola and Mozambique became independent with governments avowedly Marxist and strongly committed to the overthrow of apartheid. Angola granted the South West African People's Organization, a movement fighting for the independence of South West Africa (under South African control since the First World War but whose 'trusteeship' of the territory, originally accorded by the League of Nations, had been terminated in 1969 by the United Nations), the right to establish military training bases and transit and refugee camps in the central and southern parts of the country. Mozambique entered diplomatic relations with the ANC and permitted Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) guerrilla fighters to establish transit facilities to Swaziland and South Africa. Feeling threatened, South Africa invaded Angola in August 1975 (with secret encouragement from the United States), but its troops were forced to pull back when Cuban troops arrived. Seeking both to destabilize the Angolan government and to prevent infiltration of guerrilla fighters into Namibia, as South West Africa was known by those opposed to apartheid, South Africa maintained a military force in southern Angola for the next decade although never

admitted to this fact publicly until after the fall of apartheid. In testimony to the TRC, the South African Defence Force submitted that invasion and occupation had been necessary in order to counter 'further Soviet-led expansion in the region' (TRC, 1998, vol. 2: 21).

The PAC and the ANC also embarked on new campaigns to bring an end to white rule. Between 1975 and 1977 the PAC initiated plans to infiltrate arms and guerrillas into South Africa, especially from Swaziland where it began military training among post-Soweto refugees from South Africa. However, these plans were brought to a halt in 1977 when the Swaziland government banned the organization and deported all its members to other southern African countries. The ANC in the late 1970s, influenced in part by the findings of a delegation that had visited Vietnam in 1978 and met with the famous General Giap, who had been responsible for the military strategies of the victorious communist forces there, moved from an emphasis on rural guerrilla warfare to a focus on urban areas and a combination of political and military action. The new strategy aimed at an 'escalation of armed attacks combined with the building of mass organisations' within South Africa and had a goal of creating a general uprising or 'people's war' (TRC, 1998, vol. 2: 27–8).

With hostile neighbours and increasing internal unrest, the South African government in 1977 announced a 'Total Strategy' to overcome this 'Total Onslaught'. Although the 'Total Strategy' initially referred to military strategy, as outlined in South Africa's defence budget, it soon became apparent that Prime Minister P.W. Botha envisioned a radical restructuring of the South African government. In 1979 Botha, in consultation with the chief of the South African Defence Force, General Magnus Malan, established the National Security Management System (NSMS). This 'system' organized cabinet committees into four – constitutional affairs, economic affairs, social affairs and security – with the last being the most important. As part of the NSMS from 1979 onwards over '500 regional, district and local Joint Management Centres were put into place, theoretically enabling a co-ordinated security system to reach from the highest level to the smallest locality' (TRC, 1998, vol. 2: 29). The South African Police was given responsibility for counter-insurgency in South Africa and in Swaziland, the South African Defence Force (SADF) for the rest of southern Africa, and an official policy was adopted permitting police and defence force personnel to engage in clandestine operations beyond South Africa's borders.

Between 1979 and 1983 the South African government in the form of the South African Police and SADF was responsible for at least 30–40 assassinations (of which the letter-bomb killing of the prominent anti-apartheid activist Ruth First in Maputo in 1982 was the most publicly notorious), many more failed attempts (including at least three abortive attempts on the Umkhonto we Sizwe leader, Chris Hani), dozens more abductions (many ending in the murder of the victims once in South Africa), and thousands more deaths as a

result of raids and other military operations carried out deep into Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Given that no government-ordered assassinations have been documented for the period 1960–73, and only a few letter-bomb attacks for the years 1974–79, it is evident that there was a huge increase in state-sanctioned violence from 1979 onwards.

At the same time, Botha attempted to neutralize internal opposition to apartheid by offering Africans some limited rights. Immediately following his announcement of the ‘Total Strategy’ budget in April 1979, the government announced two fundamental shifts in policy towards Africans. African labour unions were to be recognized legally in wage negotiations for the first time, and urban Africans were to be given certain rights, including limited participation in administration boards and expanded opportunities for African entrepreneurship and home-ownership. Both of these moves represented dramatic reversals in longstanding government policies but were greeted with substantial African suspicion. Most African unions initially refused to register with the government for fear of providing officials with information that would lead to arrests and bannings. Also, a large majority of Africans, as well as Coloureds and Asians, steadfastly refused to participate in the urban councils established by the government. The government was attempting to create allies with a vested interest in maintaining the *status quo* but it was having no success.

Botha went a step further, announcing plans for a much more sweeping re-envisioning of apartheid. In July 1979, he convened a government commission to consider plans to re-write South Africa’s constitution to expand voting rights to the disenfranchised (the Schlebusch Commission). This would eventually lead to a proposal for separate parliaments to represent Coloureds and Asians, but not Africans. At the same time, Botha also vowed to promote South Africa’s alliance with a ‘constellation of African nations’ – in reality the sham homelands, which he tried to present as viable independent African countries. This new vision of apartheid was intended to present an image of rights and freedom for all, within group-identified institutions that in reality had little power and remained firmly under the control of the white South African parliament. Nevertheless, Botha calculated that his proposals would garner enough support to blunt opposition at home and abroad.

For those who refused to accept or support such reforms, the government took increasingly brutal steps to force capitulation. In addition to the secretive activities of police and military units, the government also continued to pursue official and public repression. Against a background of intensified arrests and mysterious deaths in detention, a new Internal Security Act allowed the government to investigate any person or organization and the minister of justice gained the power to ban any person without explanation. The SADF was given expanded authority over areas inside South Africa, granting the armed forces the role of policing their own citizens. In addition, the SADF

– armed with South African-manufactured weapons in the wake of an international arms embargo against South Africa – invaded the neighbouring countries of Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe in raids against suspected ANC camps and offices. To man these efforts, the government instituted a military call-up of all white males between the ages of 17 and 65 to double the size of the armed forces. Throughout this period, the government maintained a relentless policy of removing Africans from white areas, or ‘erasing black spots’ from white South Africa, in an attempt to enforce the apartheid fiction.

While intent on punishing dissent, the government nevertheless did not want to advertise its actions. Under successive legislation, the South African press was prohibited from publishing news on a variety of subjects. Information on deaths in detention could not be reported under the Inquest Act, and allegations of brutality and maladministration by the police were outlawed under the Police Act. Under the Protection of Information Act, the press was prohibited from reporting on arrests unless it could be proved that the report would not endanger state security. Television and radio news was controlled by the government and a growing number of newspapers were closed down or silenced through these laws.

Despite these efforts, protest and resistance intensified during this period. In the wake of the Soweto uprising, hundreds of young Africans had slipped across South Africa’s northern borders and volunteered to fight as guerrilla soldiers for the ANC and the PAC. In the late 1970s, some of these people began to re-enter South Africa secretly to carry out sabotage attacks on various targets that were seen as symbols of apartheid. Bombs were set off at numerous municipal buildings such as post offices and court houses. Most spectacular were bomb attacks on the government-owned South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL) plant in 1980, the Koeberg nuclear power station in 1982, and the intelligence headquarters of the South African Air Force in Pretoria in 1983. In 1983 alone, there were a reported 42 ANC attacks on government installations. In addition to these spectacular attacks, African unions mounted increasing numbers of strikes and students shut down most schools throughout the country through boycotts. Once again, repression wreaked incredible damage on the country but did not ensure the peace and security that Botha sought through the Total Strategy.

FROM FAILURE TO REFORM?: THE 1983 CONSTITUTION

The centrepiece of Botha’s efforts to convince those inside and outside South Africa that ANC criticisms were unfounded was the creation of a new constitution. Under this, separate parliaments were created for whites, Asians and Coloureds, while Africans were represented by the homeland governments. Botha explained the overarching plan in 1980: