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**THE
BERLIN
CRISIS**
1958-1962

PHILADELPHIA

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS

1971

CHAPTER I

Khrushchev's Attack on Berlin and Bonn

AS A RULE, Berlin crises coincide with extensive Soviet diplomatic activity focusing on West Germany. Soviet diplomacy in Western Europe comes alive whenever the Federal Republic reaches a new stage of growth. Stalin imposed the Berlin blockade in 1948 after the three Western powers announced a decision on West German currency reform to promote economic recovery. When the United States was anxious to rearm West Germany during the Korean war, Soviet leaders again reacted sharply and proposed a peace treaty to freeze Germany in a state of permanent disarmament and neutrality. No Berlin crisis ensued because Western plans for incorporating a West German army into a European army failed.

Following the signature of the Paris protocols of 1954 by Bonn and the Western powers, Premier Nikolai Bulganin and party secretary Khrushchev promoted a "relaxation of tensions." The protocols allowed the Federal Republic to rearm with conventional weapons within the framework of the Western European Union and NATO.¹ The Soviets, attempting to reverse the effects of the protocols, proposed that the two Germanies should become disarmed neutral buffers rather than armed camps in forward areas.²

The provision in the Paris protocols recognizing Bonn's right to speak for all Germans was as unsettling for Moscow as West German

1. *Documents*, pp. 155-172.

2. David J. Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1961), pp. 274-285.

rearmament.³ This combination of powers—rearmament and a voice for all Germans—alarmed Soviet leaders. War over Berlin is a nightmare for the West. But the prospect of a resurgent Germany, armed both with weapons and with claims against the East, is the Soviets' nightmare. The Kremlin leaders made a decision in 1955 to try to elicit from the West a denial of Bonn's all-German pretensions. They adopted a policy favoring recognition of two German states and took steps to implement it. They bestowed diplomatic recognition on East Germany and opened negotiations with Bonn to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany. In according sovereignty to East Germany, they granted it control of West German civilian access to Berlin.⁴ They organized the Warsaw Pact as a legal means of keeping troops in the sovereign states of Eastern Europe.

In addition, the Soviet leaders proposed to abandon the occupation of Austria and agreed to an Austrian state treaty. They wanted Austria to serve as an example of a neutral, disarmed buffer in Central Europe. Austria illustrated what Germany could be like. Khrushchev and Bulganin pressed a package of European security proposals on the Western powers at the Geneva summit conference of 1955, with the Austrian model in mind.

Between 1955 and 1958, Soviet diplomacy sponsored or endorsed a number of plans for disengagement of the great powers from Germany requiring Bonn to leave NATO and East Germany to leave the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev's objectives in the Berlin crisis of

3. In the Final Act of the Nine Power Conference held at London, September 28–October 3, 1954, the United States, Britain, and France declared that "they consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs." In exchange for this declaration, Bonn pledged "never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic. . . ." United States Department of State, *London and Paris Agreements, September–October 1954*, Publication 8659 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 16-17.

4. In an exchange of letters between East German Foreign Minister Bolz and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin on September 20, 1955, the two parties agreed that the East German state "exercises control over . . . the lines of communication between the German Federal Republic and West Berlin situated on GDR territory." They exempted Western military traffic: "the control of traffic of troops and material of the garrisons of France, England, and the United States stationed in West Berlin passing between the German Federal Republic and West Berlin, will temporarily be exercised by the command of Soviet troops in Germany, pending the conclusion of an appropriate agreement." *Documents*, p. 189.

1958–1962 were the 1955 policy goals. The Soviets never really wanted Germany to rearm. They controlled East German rearmament and had little to fear from it. But they regarded Bonn's rearmament with dread and foreboding. In their minds, Bonn's new army, the Bundeswehr, appeared as old German militarism dressed in American fatigues.

The depth of feeling about Germany retained by Soviet leaders was strikingly apparent in 1955 when they invited Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to Moscow to negotiate diplomatic relations with Bonn. As a condition for relations, Adenauer insisted on the release of German prisoners of war. This issue produced angry exchanges as the former enemies tortured each other with memories of the brutalities each had inflicted on the other in 1941–1945. Bulganin and Khrushchev raged about the slaughter of the Soviet population. Adenauer reminded them of atrocities the Red Army committed across Eastern and Central Europe. However, Adenauer took pains to distance himself from Hitler, saying: "I would have strangled Hitler with my own hands." Klaus Mehnert captured the spirit of the exchange:

The main characters were not those present at the conference table in the Spiridonovka Palace, but the dead and wounded, the prisoners of war and those ravaged in the years 1941–45. They caused a sudden darkening of the bright conference room and filled the hearts and the lips of the men who were negotiating. In a German legend the ghosts of the men killed in the great battles of European history continued their fight for many years afterward; the contest on the battlefield was so violent that they could not find peace. Russian mythology contains similar legends. I was reminded of it again and again on that Saturday. The sufferings and emotions of the years 1941 through 1945 were still so much alive that even the wise, nearly eighty-year-old Chancellor, with his iron nerves, could not help being upset. It all probably had to be said once, because too much had been accumulated in the feelings of both peoples, and a valve had to be opened.⁵

5. Klaus Mehnert, *Osteuropa*, Stuttgart, December, 1955, p. 451, cited in Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-265; see also Wilhelm Backhaus, *Begegnung in Kreml: So würden die Gefangenen befreit* (Meeting at the Kremlin: Thus Were the Prisoners Liberated) (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 1955); Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1953–1955* (Memoirs) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1966), chapter 13.

Both sides purged themselves of pent-up emotions. Bonn agreed to restore relations and the Soviets to release German prisoners.

Even though relations were established in 1955, no territorial claims were settled. The Second World War still survives in the claims Bonn and Moscow have to the territories that lie between them. Bonn claims to speak for Germans in East Germany and has an interest in the Oder-Neisse territories—the former German provinces occupied by the Soviet Union and Poland at the end of the war. In 1954, Bonn renounced the use of force to achieve any eastern objectives and, as a practical matter, depends on NATO to defend West German territory. Bonn keeps its claims alive for bargaining purposes when, someday, a settlement can be reached. To Bonn, the claims have value in international law.⁶

To the Soviets, international legalists in their fashion, Bonn's claims must be formally and irrevocably withdrawn. The Soviet Union is as unhappy about the absence of a peace treaty deciding the territorial issues in its favor as the United States is about the absence of a written agreement regulating Berlin access. Moscow still wants the temporary border settlement in the Potsdam protocol of 1945 to be legally acknowledged by the Western powers. If they are willing, presumably Bonn would be compelled to acknowledge the Potsdam settlement as a permanent legal one.

In line with the 1955 policy decision to promote two Germanies—disarmed and neutral, recognized as such in international law—Premier Bulganin in December 1957 proposed a summit conference to discuss creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe embracing West Germany, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. President Eisenhower objected to this proposal because it did not address the division of Germany which the United States preferred to resolve first.⁷ The Soviets pursued their proposal well into 1958, beginning in February with the offer of a foreign ministers' conference to prepare a summit agenda for considering creation of a nuclear-free zone, reduction in the numbers of foreign troops in Germany, and—

6. Wilhelm G. Grewe, "The Eastern Problem' in German Foreign Policy," 1959, Mimeograph. The Treaty of August 12, 1970 signed in Moscow by Chancellor Willy Brandt and Premier Alexei Kosygin holds these claims in reserve without abandoning them. The treaty is primarily a renunciation of force agreement. Cf. Federal Republic of Germany, Press and Information Office, *The Treaty of August 12, 1970*, Wiesbaden, 1970, p. 8.

7. *Documents*, p. 263.

an item unmentioned in Bulganin's December letter—conclusion of a German peace treaty. "Of course," the February aide memoire said, "the question of unification of the German Democratic Republic and Federal German Republic into one state . . . cannot be the subject of consideration at a forthcoming conference at the Summit." Secretary of State John Foster Dulles decided there was little point to another summit conference if the Soviets proposed to ignore the results of the last one in 1955 at Geneva. He argued that they had agreed at the 1955 summit that the great powers had a responsibility for the reunification of Germany.⁸

This unproductive dialogue continued through the spring of 1958. It ended abruptly in July, when crises in the Near East and Taiwan Straits seized the attention of Dulles and the Soviet leaders. A coup d'état in Baghdad removed Iraq from the Western camp, giving Eisenhower reason to feel he should send troops to Lebanon to stabilize the Near East. The Taiwan Straits crisis—Mao's bold attempt to isolate and subdue Chiang Kai-shek's garrisons on Quemoy and Matsu—followed on the heels of the Lebanon landing. In September, Moscow found time to inform the Western powers that it had received a diplomatic note from Pankow⁹ proposing "the urgent creation" of a four-power commission to prepare a peace treaty and another commission composed of the two German governments to discuss reunification.¹⁰ The State Department replied negatively. The German issue rested in a stalemate until November when Khrushchev, with the crisis in the Far East clearly terminated, turned back to the subject of a German peace treaty.

The Soviets persisted with Bulganin's proposal for a Central European nuclear-free zone because, again, they were reacting to a new stage in the evolution of the Federal Republic. They now

8. *Ibid.*, p. 285; Dulles made much of the following statement in the 1955 summit communiqué: "The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security." The preceding paragraph in the communiqué, on European security, was of much greater interest to Moscow.

9. The seat of the government in East Germany is located in Pankow, a borough of East Berlin.

10. George D. Embree (ed.), *The Soviet Union and the German Question*, September 1958-June 1961 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 3-4.

perceived that West German rearmament would include access to nuclear weapons. In Bulganin's December 1957 letter, he referred to the United States plan to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons (IRBM's) in Western Europe. In November 1957, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy announced to a NATO parliamentarians' conference that the United States wanted to establish IRBM sites in Europe and would consider granting allied control, not just of the launching vehicles, but of the warheads as well.¹¹ This proposal, with the implication of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Bundeswehr, the West German army, staggered the Soviets. Secretary Dulles, at a press conference, tried to be more explicit than McElroy, stating that the U.S. wanted "a very considerable measure of allied participation." He did not say that any allied power would have access to warheads.¹²

Bulganin expressed the Kremlin's fears openly when he wrote: "One likewise cannot fail to take into account, for example, the fact that the placing of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Federal Republic of Germany may set in motion such forces in Europe and entail such consequences as even the NATO members may not contemplate."¹³ The Soviets thus reacted to the awful possibilities they foresaw by proposing a summit conference to consider alternatives to the McElroy plan for NATO. Bulganin proposed a nuclear-free zone to prevent Bonn from acquiring direct or proximate access to nuclear weapons.

Bulganin's letter arrived in Washington on December 10, 1957. A few days later, the NATO foreign ministers held their annual meeting in Paris and agreed to the following plan: (1) bilateral agreements would be negotiated by the United States and interested allied governments for the deployment of IRBM's; (2) any decision actually to use the missiles would be a joint one, the United States retaining control of the warheads, the host ally control of the launching vehicles; and (3) nuclear warheads would be stockpiled in Europe under the custody of General Lauris Norstad, NATO supreme commander.

During 1958, Bonn urged the Eisenhower Administration to proceed in deploying nuclear weapons to West Germany in terms of the December 1957 NATO agreement ensuring American control of

11. *The New York Times*, November 16, 1957, p. 1.

12. *Ibid.*, November 20, 1957, p. 1.

13. *Documents*, p. 254.

warheads. In the same period, Moscow persisted with its alternative of regional disarmament. This struggle between Bonn and Moscow for influence over the direction of United States policy in Europe provided the immediate context for the Berlin crisis beginning in November. The crisis compelled the United States to pay attention to the alternatives Moscow outlined. Throughout the entire crisis over Berlin 1958-1962, the United States was caught between the rival demands of Bonn and Moscow. United States efforts to find some ground between the two for terminating the Berlin crisis and providing European security invariably got vetoed by Bonn or Moscow. The United States listened to Bonn as an ally, of course, but Khrushchev could always catch the ear of the President by reheating the crisis and threatening to blockade the exposed city.

The acute issue of nuclear weapons in Germany arose because of the Eisenhower Administration's decision in the autumn of 1957 to request the NATO Council for agreement to deploy them. But that decision, in turn, was a reaction to the spectacular space satellite launchings by the Soviet Union in late summer, 1957. The boosters necessary for the launchings implied that the Soviets had the capacity to develop missiles of intercontinental range (ICBM's). Bulganin, in his December letter, alluded to this factor: "It is also very obvious that all such activity [the U.S. plan for IRBM deployments in Europe] is taking place in an atmosphere of artificially created nervousness and fear with respect to the imaginary threat from the USSR and, in the effort to create such an atmosphere, particularly wide use is being made of references to the latest scientific and technical achievements of the Soviet Union."¹⁴

Perhaps if Khrushchev had not so obviously tried to blackmail British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet in the 1956 Suez crisis—threatening their countries with utter destruction unless their troops withdrew from the Canal Zone—and, generally, to make political hay out of Soviet nuclear capabilities, the administration might not have felt compelled to move its available IRBM's to within range of the Soviet Union after the latest development in Soviet nuclear power.¹⁵ The National Security Council reached the conclusion that the U.S. could survive the political

14. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

15. For an analysis of Khrushchev's behavior in the Suez crisis, see Hans Speier, "Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance," *World Politics*, 19 (April 1957), 307-328.

repercussions of an alleged "missile gap" favoring the Soviet Union by deploying missiles to Europe, much as Khrushchev decided in 1962 when he confronted a "missile gap" favoring the United States and deployed missiles to Cuba. In both instances, intermediate-range missiles were used as surrogate ICBM's, simply moved forward to cover the distance to target an ICBM could reach from greater distances.

Even in his letter to Eisenhower, Bulganin did not refrain from stressing that the new developments in Soviet nuclear power meant the territory of the United States would no longer be a sanctuary in the event of general war. He argued that forward deployment of United States missiles would not lessen the vulnerability of the United States itself. The administration, however, wanted to avoid a potential crisis of confidence in NATO resulting from doubts about the willingness of the United States to jeopardize itself in defending Western Europe. By sending missiles to Europe, the administration locked the United States into the defense of its allies much as NATO's dependence on the presence of American ground troops in West Germany had done earlier.

The development of long-range missiles by the Soviet Union and repeated use of this development by the Soviet leaders for political purposes created a chain of events. The Eisenhower Administration's reaction to the Soviets' newly acquired missile power produced, in turn, a protest from Bulganin that led eventually, as events tumbled from one quarter of the globe to another in 1958, to the Berlin crisis late in the year.

1. *A Trial Balloon*

The "deadline crisis" of 1958 began with the Soviet note of November 27, containing a deadline of six months before which, Moscow insisted, negotiations about the future of Berlin had to be productive. Before sending the note, Khrushchev floated a trial balloon carrying the major provisions to be included in the note.

Speaking at a Soviet-Polish Friendship Meeting in Moscow on November 10, he lectured the Western powers on the real results of the Potsdam protocol. This protocol between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union in August 1945 banned any substantial German rearmament and required an emphasis on "agriculture and

peaceful domestic industries."¹⁶ Khrushchev proudly noted that the Soviet Union had observed the measures of the protocol, to which the "anti-militarist, anti-fascist workers' state" of East Germany bore witness. By contrast, West Germany had taken a different path. Aided by the Western powers, he claimed, "militarism, far from having been eradicated, is rearing its head ever higher . . .," fascist generals and admirals are reconstructing the Wehrmacht—the Nazi army—and West German industry is redeveloping on a massive scale in the service of German militarism.

The Western allies, he suggested, had violated the protocol in all respects save one. The West retained its military presence in West Berlin because Western policy needed a source of subversion against the East German state—the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR). Khrushchev said he saw no point in perpetuating the Western garrisons as a provision of the Potsdam protocol when the other provisions had been grossly violated. Therefore, he concluded:

The time has obviously arrived for the signatories of the Potsdam Agreement to renounce the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin and thereby make it possible to create a normal situation in the capital of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Union, for its part, would hand over to the sovereign German Democratic Republic the functions in Berlin that are still exercised by Soviet agencies.¹⁷

He apparently wished to convey the impression that the Soviet Union would withdraw unilaterally from the occupation agencies in which it still participated in Berlin. Eventually, in August 1962, the USSR disengaged selectively. It abolished the Soviet commandant's office in Karlshorst, a section of East Berlin, but retained an air control staff at the Berlin Air Safety Center and in other similar posts. The circumstances of the withdrawal in 1962, however, were very different from those in which he announced his intentions in 1958.

Secretary of State Dulles, at his next press conference, alluded to one curious point in Khrushchev's description of the Potsdam protocol. Khrushchev attributed the occupation of Berlin to the Potsdam protocol of 1945, when, in fact, the occupation derived from the

16. *Documents*, pp. 29-39.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

occupation protocol of 1944.¹⁸ The Potsdam protocol concerned the regulation of German political and economic life in the occupation zones well established by the time of the Potsdam Conference.¹⁹ Dulles thought that Khrushchev's legal advisers simply made a mistake, and Khrushchev did acknowledge the correct origin later. Dulles may have diagnosed this curiosity accurately. Or Khrushchev may have attributed the origin of the occupation to the Potsdam protocol in order to overturn the remnants of the occupation regime more readily. Contending that the West had broken the Potsdam protocol by sponsoring the growth of the Federal Republic, he was at liberty to do the same, in this case, to terminate the occupation status of Berlin. This interpretation suggests that he deliberately rewrote history to favor his case. In any event, on November 10 he anticipated his later tactics in using the occupation issue and the status of Berlin as a lever for moving the Western powers to alter the status quo.

2. *The Soviet Note of November 27, 1958*

The Soviets dispatched a diplomatic note from Moscow addressed to the other three occupation powers in Berlin and to Bonn demanding a "solution" of the Berlin question in six months. The note constituted a bold and assertive move not altogether reflected in the press comment of the time.²⁰ The note offered a forecast of Soviet policy and action over the next four years. The Soviets probably did not expect the crisis to become as protracted as it did, but the claims they staked out for themselves in the note did not change, even though, periodically, they restated them in new form.²¹

A free city proposal was the central point of the note:

18. See *ibid.*, pp. 1-8.

19. See *ibid.*, pp. 29-39.

20. The press generally fastened on the deadline clause and interpreted it to mean that the Soviets had postponed any immediate action for six months. The *Times* (London) spoke of a "period of grace" and *The New York Times* reported a "sense of relief" in the British Foreign Office. *The Times* (London), November 28, 1958, p. 2; *The New York Times*, November 28, 1958, p. 12. The State Department was also reported "relieved at delay." *ibid.*, November 29, p. 1. These reactions were understandable in the context, however, because Soviet Ambassador Smirnov in Bonn previously had said the Soviets hoped to have the problem solved by Christmas.

21. For the text of the note, see *Documents*, pp. 348-363.

The Soviet Government on its part would consider it possible to solve the West Berlin question at the present time by the conversion of West Berlin into an independent political unit—a free city, without any state, including both existing German states, interfering in its life. Specifically it might be possible to agree that the territory of the free city be demilitarized and that no armed forces be contained therein. The free city, West Berlin, could have its own government and run its own economic, administrative, and other affairs.²²

To achieve this solution, the Soviets proposed that the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, the Federal Republic, and the DDR all offer guarantees for the free city status of West Berlin. The Soviets also invited the United Nations to approve the arrangement. West Berlin would be expected to negotiate with the DDR for access to West Germany.

For its part of the bargain, West Berlin would have to pledge not to permit "any hostile subversive activity" against the DDR. The Soviets acclaimed their solution to the Berlin question as a settlement which should be satisfactory to all parties. They offered to underwrite West Berlin's economy "by placing orders for industrial goods . . . and by regular deliveries on a commercial basis of the necessary quantities of raw materials and food stuffs. . . ." They suggested that West Berlin could prosper more under the new status than under the occupation regime.

Although the Soviet Union disclaimed any desire to annex West Berlin, it granted itself and the DDR a prominent place in the free city. As a former occupying power in all-Berlin—which virtually meant East Berlin—the Soviet Union proposed to join in the guarantees for West Berlin, an advance over its previous position. A desire to enhance Soviet influence over the population of West Berlin is also evident from its offer to underwrite the West Berlin economy, an opportunity previously unavailable. The most pointed aspects of the proposal were the provisions for demilitarizing the free city and for granting the DDR control of the access routes. All of these provisions made the proposal suspect because they would cause West Berlin to lose the means to sustain itself. Without independent military resources and communications, how could the Soviets speak of the city as "an independent political unit"? If the free city de-

22. *Ibid.*, p. 360.

pendent on the continued suffrance of the Soviet Union and the DDR for its freedom, technically, the "free city" would be a misnomer.

As a legal agreement between the Western powers and the DDR, the pact guaranteeing the new status of West Berlin would bestow Western diplomatic recognition upon the DDR. The DDR's gain would be the Federal Republic's loss. Bonn could no longer act as the sole recognized representative of the German people as the Western powers, in the 1954 Paris protocols, stated it should be.

The deadline clause was contained in the following passage:

The Soviet Government proposes to make no changes in the present procedure for military traffic of the USA, Great Britain, and France from West Berlin to the FRG for half a year. It regards such a period as fully sufficient to provide a sound basis for the solution of the questions connected with the change in Berlin's situation. . . .²³

The Western powers had until May 27, 1959, to negotiate an agreement embodying the free city proposal. The Soviets said no other proposal would be acceptable.

To prod the Western powers in the desired direction, the note included a threat to act unilaterally and to disrupt the Berlin access routes:

If the above-mentioned period is not utilized to reach an adequate agreement the Soviet Union will then carry out the planned measures through an agreement with the GDR. It is envisaged that the German Democratic Republic, like any other independent state must fully deal with questions concerning its space, i.e., exercise its sovereignty on land, on water, and in the air.²⁴

And to stir up public opinion in Western countries, the note ended in a recitation of the horrors of war.

One section toward the end of the note illustrated how the Soviet Union used its new missile power for political purposes: "He who

23. *Documents*, p. 361; Hans Speier regarded this statement as an ultimatum. While subject to manipulation, he said, it was more direct and unequivocal than similar, but implied, Soviet ultimatums in the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. *Divided Berlin: The Anatomy of Soviet Blackmail* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 31-32.

24. *Documents*, p. 361.

today speaks of non-recognition of the steps planned by the Soviet Union obviously would like to talk with the latter not in the language of reason and well-founded arguments but in the language of brute force, forgetting that the Soviet people are not affected by threats . . ." The Soviets aimed their warning at Dulles in particular—the alleged brinkman. Dulles was warned not to interfere as the Soviet Union, the injured party under the Potsdam protocol, pressed for redress of its grievances in Berlin:

Methods of blackmail and reckless threats of force will be least of all appropriate in solving such a problem as the Berlin question. Such methods will not help solve a single question, but can only bring the situation to the danger point. But only madmen can go to the length of unleashing another world war over the preservation of privileges of occupiers in West Berlin. If such madmen should really appear, there is no doubt that strait jackets could be found for them . . . Any violation of the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, or Czechoslovakia, any aggressive action against any member state of the Warsaw treaty will be regarded by all its participants as an act of aggression against them all and will immediately cause appropriate retaliation.²⁵

This kind of language appeared in Khrushchev's correspondence with Eisenhower in both the Near East and Taiwan Straits crises. In the latter crisis, Eisenhower considered the intent of one of the letters so intimidating that he refused to accept it.²⁶

Another aspect of the note is interesting for its psychology. The note portrayed the situation in Berlin as abnormal. Time had passed Berlin by, the note suggested, while the DDR developed and matured. It argued that the Western presence in West Berlin was an anachronism, sustained by incredible "feelings of hatred for communism." By contrast, it advertised the Soviet proposal, in tune with the times, as the ally of reason. In couching their argument in terms of a political psychology, the Soviet leaders expressed the aspect of their position that most troubled Dulles. Granting the West no rational ground for remaining in West Berlin, they conveyed the impression that the West could not be serious in holding onto its position there.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

26. Morton H. Halperin (ed.), *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1967), p. 284.

It was as if the West would be bluffing if it declared the status of Berlin unalterable. Thus, Western decision-makers could not ignore the possibility that the Soviets were embarked upon an extraordinarily ambitious postwar confrontation to turn United States policy in Europe around and to point it in directions more compatible with Soviet long-range objectives. At a minimum, the Soviets were trying to undermine the legitimacy of the Berlin status quo.

On the evening of November 27, Chairman Khrushchev held a press conference on the subject of the note just released, an unprecedented practice for him. When asked why the Soviet government had selected this particular time to make its proposal, Khrushchev candidly stated that the Western powers had raised an "obstacle to the conclusion of a peace treaty . . . in their willingness to recognize realities of life"—two Germanies. His answer implied that the note had been sent because the Western powers had refused negotiations about a nuclear-free zone earlier in the year at the summit or any other level. Summing up his case, Khrushchev stated:

One must proceed from the real facts. There is a divided Berlin where the occupation regime is still maintained. The war ended more than 13 years ago. Every normal person, I think, finds such a situation abnormal. It is necessary, therefore, to find a solution that will end this abnormality, because the present existence of the occupation regime serves no positive purpose at all.²⁷

In reply to a question about the feasibility of negotiations if the Soviet proposal were the only one discussed, Khrushchev said there would be nothing to discuss if the United States "rejects as a whole the question posed in our document." However, he welcomed a move "to specify and discuss our proposals." In the context of the press conference which was free of the bluster and threats contained in the note, Khrushchev's answer appeared to indicate a certain flexibility. The very fact that he held a press conference for the purpose of entertaining questions on the note added to the appearance of flexibility. However, by holding a press conference on the same day Moscow released the note, he underlined the message of the note.

Khrushchev intimated on November 29 that the Soviet Union would take no unilateral action if the West were willing to *begin*

27. Embree, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

negotiations in six months.²⁸ This remark qualified the urgent terms of the note that "adequate agreement" had to *be achieved* within six months. On the day before Khrushchev dropped his hint of Soviet desires, a Soviet diplomat in East Berlin went even further than the Chairman in stating that Moscow would not be rigid about the six-month time limit.²⁹

3. *Berlin as a Lever*

The initial United States reaction to the note ignored the narrowness of Soviet terms for negotiations. This reaction provided the Soviets with an opportunity to clarify their demands before the crisis was a month old. New York and Washington newspapers asserted that, contrary to what the Soviets said, the note was not directed at a Berlin solution as much as at negotiations on German reunification and European security. James Reston reported that the State Department viewed the Soviet proposal on Berlin as an opportunity to reopen larger issues of European security. Walter Lippman suggested the Soviets intended to employ the Berlin problem "as an instrument for raising the whole question of Germany."³⁰

Replying on December 3 to these assertions, the Soviet government organ, *Izvestiia*, objected to the United States raising larger issues. Specifically, *Izvestiia* denied the possibility of treating German reunification as a subject of four-power negotiations and emphasized Berlin as the issue at hand. It commented on Reston's report by criticizing the State Department for "artificially stringing on some problems to others."³¹

Press comment in December 1958 reflected the reactions of Secretary Dulles and officials in the State Department. In expressing the view that the Soviet Union really wanted to consider a wider range of subjects than Berlin, the Department did not read the *Izvestiia* statement at face value. *The New York Times* reported the following

28. Khrushchev made his remark at an Albanian Embassy reception. The Soviet press did not report it. Speier, *Divided Berlin*, p. 11.

29. *The New York Times*, November 29, 1958, p. 1; in Pankow, Ulbricht appeared more rigid. In an interview with Sydney Gruson he stated that an allied airlift defying a Soviet transfer of traffic management to the DDR would constitute a military threat to the DDR. *The New York Times*, November 30, 1958, p. 1.

30. *The New York Times*, December 1, 1958; *The Herald Tribune*, December 2, 1958, p. 22.

31. *The New York Times*, December 4, 1958, p. 1.

statements attributed to "one Western diplomat": "What we are saying . . . is that we don't think the Russians meant what their note in fact said—namely, that if the Western powers did not agree to discuss making Berlin a demilitarized free city there was no topic left to talk on the Berlin question by the former occupation powers." The diplomat said that the West's ignoring passages in the note gave them "the benefit of whatever slight doubt there might be. All they need to do to keep in the clear is to keep quiet."³²

At the time, the Soviets themselves did not make as much of a distinction between what they said and what they meant as the Department assumed. The Soviet note of November 27 contained much bluff and bluster. But the threat of unilateral action in the note served the specific policy task of moving the Western powers to consider the free city proposal. In the Berlin crisis, the Soviets generally said what they meant. In the note of November 27, they clearly stated the solution to the Berlin question they preferred: the free city proposal.³³

The State Department treated Soviet diplomatic communications as mere propaganda. The Department freely substituted its own version of Soviet objectives for the objectives the Soviets actually had in mind. This practice of the Department allowed speculation about the "real intentions" hidden behind Soviet rhetoric and ignored the possibility that major Soviet documents, speeches, and diplomatic

32. *The New York Times*, January 1, 1959, p. 1; also December 3, 1958, p. 1.

33. Alexander George has described how Soviet and American approaches to risk calculation and risk acceptance differ. United States decision-makers control their risks by limiting their objectives. Soviet leaders, in contrast, accept far-reaching objectives and control their risks by limiting their means. George notes that Western decision-makers do not appreciate the distinction between the two approaches. "As for Western leaders and publics, their tendency to perceive and interpret Soviet risk-acceptance behavior erroneously from the standpoint of their own approach to risk calculation inclined them to make distorted judgments regarding Soviet intentions and the riskiness and significance of Soviet cold war initiatives. (One may note that, over time, Western leaders have perhaps come to understand better the Soviet approach to risk calculation and risk acceptance)." "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, 13 (June 1969), 215. George's analysis applies to the State Department's perception of Soviet behavior in the Berlin crisis. The Department did not believe that the far-reaching goals in the Soviets' free city proposal represented their intentions. They must be willing to settle for less, the Department assumed. In the Berlin crisis, Secretary Dulles substituted his own judgment of Soviet risk acceptance for the Soviets' preferred style of behavior, a style markedly different from Dulles'. This problem is discussed further in Chapter 2.

correspondence were quite carefully composed and intended to indicate Soviet official views.

Thus, the State Department perceived an implied willingness in the Soviet note to negotiate about Germany and European security, including Berlin. Since these broader questions were what the United States preferred to negotiate anyway, the Department, in effect, read its preferences into the note. Naturally, the Department wanted to negotiate on issues of greatest interest to the United States. The remarkable fact is that it believed it could negotiate on those issues in a heated atmosphere without misleading the Soviets to expect pressure tactics to produce concessions. If, however, the Department read the note at face value as a strictly Berlin proposal, as *Izvestiia* urged, a serious question remained whether the United States should be willing to enter negotiations under crisis conditions. Secretary Dulles had to decide whether or not to negotiate in the crisis and that decision rested on how he and the Department read the note.

In deference to the Western problem of note reading, it should be said that the Soviet position contained many elements, not all of which were revealed in the November 27 note. In their note, the Soviets used the Berlin proposal as the anchor of their position and the exclusive subject of the proposed negotiations. Yet they raised the "deadline crisis" to bring about negotiations for a nuclear-free zone to be embodied in a German peace treaty. It is important to observe that for them a Berlin settlement conditioned the broader negotiations in which they were interested. The Department accurately perceived that the Soviets were interested in discussing Germany and European security. But the Department discounted Moscow's insistence that unless Berlin were settled first the broader issues could not be satisfactorily discussed.

In the Soviet view the free city proposal operated as a pilot project for changing the status quo in Germany and Europe. Indeed, if the Western powers could accept the free city proposal as a model of change they would be psychologically prepared to accept the other "realities," as Moscow called them, of two Germanies and the forces favoring a nuclear-free zone. The Soviets, at any rate, had linked all the issues together.³⁴ Thus, the Soviets raised other issues in their Berlin proposal, but they raised them in a special way to favor their

34. The close and ingenious linkage between the free city proposal, diplomatic recognition of the DDR, and a nuclear-free zone is examined in detail in Chapter 3.

cause. The Soviets objected to the manner in which the United States approached negotiations and were quick to insist that Berlin should be the focus. Their deadline focused negotiations on Berlin because they directed the threat of unilateral action—conveyed by the deadline—against West Berlin.

Soviet reactions to the State Department's response to the note bear out this interpretation of the Soviet position. On December 12, in response to preliminary American statements about the note, Tass news service charged that the United States refused to assess soberly the situation emerging in Europe caused by the occupation regime in West Berlin. It rejected the State Department's attempt "to avoid" a Berlin solution by "speculation on the problem of German reunification" and, for the moment, stated that "the preparation and conclusion of a German peace treaty is another matter."³⁵

On December 16, the NATO Ministerial Council issued a declaration expressing the decision of the Western powers to enter into broad negotiations. The declaration rebuffed Moscow's demand for narrow negotiations: "The Council considers that the Berlin question can only be settled in the framework of an agreement with the USSR on Germany as a whole. It recalls that the Western powers have repeatedly declared themselves ready to examine this problem as well as those of European security and disarmament."³⁶

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko reacted on December 25 by saying that the Western powers had not "correctly understood the intentions of the Soviet Union." In so far as they were reading "hidden motives" into the Soviet position, they were mistaken. "But the Soviet government has nothing to conceal. In making its proposals on the Berlin question it is guided by the sole desire to put an end to the dangerous situation prevailing in West Berlin."³⁷ Gromyko referred to the NATO interest in linking a Berlin solution to German reunification as a "trick" for postponing a Berlin settlement.

4. *The Soviet Draft Peace Treaty*

On January 10, 1959, the Soviet Union presented a draft peace treaty for Germany to the Western powers, revealing their full

35. Embree, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

36. *Documents*, p. 365.

37. Embree, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

position. The accompanying note employed language similar to the Soviet note on Berlin of November 27, speaking of "that entirely abnormal situation" resulting from the delay in concluding a peace treaty with Germany and recognizing the DDR. The Kremlin proposed a peace conference for March 1959 in Warsaw or Prague to which both Germanies would be invited to sign the treaty "in the name of Germany."

By submitting a draft treaty so soon after the note of November 27, the Soviets maintained momentum for their campaign. The Western allies had just replied on December 21 to the earlier note and now faced another major document before the "deadline crisis" prompted by the first note had been resolved. More importantly, the note accompanying the draft treaty linked the treaty to a Berlin settlement:

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States of America will study with the necessary attention the proposals brought forward and also the attached draft of a peace treaty . . . *together with this* it would like to believe that the Government of the United States of America . . . will draw the necessary conclusions from the situation of the Berlin question . . . [my emphasis].³⁸

The note and draft treaty of January 10 were part of the same effort expressed in the note of November 27. Much of the January 10 note, discussing a peace treaty, actually dealt with Berlin. In this note, the Soviets categorically rejected any four-power discussion of German reunification. The notes of November 27 and January 10 both argued for a Berlin settlement. The first note demanded a settlement directly; the second note demanded it as a prerequisite to a peace treaty. The November note proposed narrow negotiations on Berlin only; the January note made a bid for broad negotiations on the narrow basis of a prior Berlin solution.

The draft treaty itself revealed that Moscow intended the free city proposal to work as a model solution for Germany as a whole. The features of the new Germany were substantially identical to those of the free city.³⁹ The new Germany, like the new West Berlin, would be independent, demilitarized, and engaged in peaceful production. Moreover, the Soviets designed the peace treaty and the free city

38. *Documents*, p. 389.

39. For the text of the treaty proposal, see *ibid.*, pp. 389-401.

proposal to give them an effective veto in the deliberations leading to adoption. The preamble to the treaty indicates that one-third of the parties of the treaty would represent the Soviet position. Twenty-nine states, "as states which participated with their armed forces in the war against Germany," and Germany, "represented at the present time by the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany," would participate in the peace conference. By restricting the conference to the states which had fought against Germany rather than including all those which had declared war, and by placing the DDR on equal footing with the Federal Republic, one-third of the delegations could be relied upon to support the Soviet draft of a treaty or to veto any other version. In the note of November 27, an identical proportion—one-third—of the guarantors of the free city status of West Berlin would possess a veto.

The draft peace treaty omitted any provision for the reunification of Germany. This omission offered further evidence that the Soviet Union did not intend to discuss solutions of most interest to the Western powers, particularly the Federal Republic. In Article 22, the parties to the peace conference were to conclude a treaty with two Germanies. Reunification, if it occurred at all, would come about in the post-treaty period on the basis of "a rapprochement . . . between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany." Article 23 specifically prohibited Bonn's version of reunification and Article 8 kept the demarcation line between the two Germanies in place. The treaty actually provided for three Germanies. The text incorporated the free city proposal which appeared as Article 25:

Until the re-establishment of the unity of Germany and the creation of a unified German state, West Berlin will be in a position of a demilitarized free city on the basis of its own special statute.⁴⁰

The draft treaty left the DDR relatively untouched. DDR sovereignty would be extended to all traffic on the Berlin access routes. By contrast, the provisions of the treaty made it clear that the Federal Republic would have to revert to Potsdam-like conditions in the post-treaty period. Bonn could not participate in any military alliance, e.g., NATO. It could not continue to ban the West German

40. *Ibid.*, p. 396.

Communist party or continue to allow anti-Soviet groups or parties in West Germany. It could not allow any foreign troops, military bases, or nuclear weapons on its territory. It would have a "peace economy." Khrushchev had argued on November 10 that these were criteria the DDR already had met or to which it could easily adapt. The government in Bonn regarded the draft treaty as a very harsh document.⁴¹

5. *The Changing Status Quo*

The draft peace treaty for Germany and the free city proposal for Berlin announced the Soviet Union's objectives in the Berlin crisis. Western leaders in 1958 could not be certain that Khrushchev really expected to achieve his objectives. They could only know that he intended to move them toward his objectives. And he certainly could not know how far he could move them. Probably he planned to probe and push where and when he could, depending on the evolution of the crisis, and to match his opportunities to his objectives.

Khrushchev perceived that in the case of Germany the status quo could be manipulated. His belief is illustrated by a statement he made on Germany in December 1957. He said, "On the basis of the status quo conditions could be created for the solution of the German problem."⁴² In other words, he regarded the two Germanies as a given "basis" of things, but—more noteworthy—as a starting point from which he could proceed toward "created" conditions improving upon the place of the two Germanies in Europe.

After an interview with Khrushchev in October 1958, Walter Lippman described Khrushchev's view of the status quo:

In his mind, the social and economic revolution now in progress in Russia, China, and elsewhere in Asia and Africa is the status quo and he wants us to recognize it as such. In his mind, opposition to this revolution is an attempt to change the status quo. Whereas we think of the status quo as the situation as it exists at the moment, he thinks of it as the process of revolutionary change which is in progress. He wants us to recognize the revolution not only as it is but as it is going to be [emphasis his].⁴³

41. *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 13, 1959, p. 2.

42. Cited in David J. Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

43. *The Communist World and Ours* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959), p. 13.

Khrushchev's optimism and implied philosophy of history did not receive much recognition from Western analysts grappling with the implications of the "deadline crisis." Although most analysts agreed that he desired changes in the Berlin occupation regime, they did not as readily agree that he wanted changes in Germany at large. Some British analysts, for example, thought he intended only to consolidate the Soviet position in Central Europe to prevent any further uprisings, as had actually occurred in East Germany in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956. This opinion represented the traditional Western concept of the status quo, noted by Lippman, as a set of fixed conditions and did not acknowledge the dynamism Khrushchev attributed to the status quo as a process of historical change. The British and American press speculated that internal political and economic weaknesses of the DDR compelled the Soviet initiative.⁴⁴ By 1958, however, Premier Walter Ulbricht of the DDR had actually strengthened his internal position.⁴⁵ The static concepts inherent in the speculation did not fully account for the crisis.

J. M. Mackintosh, a British analyst, suspected that the Soviet Union was searching for ways to achieve long-term security. Gromyko confirmed this rationale, later, at the Geneva Conference of 1959. Mackintosh believed that the "deadline crisis" was caused by the Soviet reaction to the NATO agreement of the previous year for emplacing tactical nuclear weapons of the United States on the Continent. He regarded both the note of November 27 and the draft peace treaty as tactics in the campaign for a nuclear-free zone.⁴⁶ Richard Löwenthal, writing from Berlin, assessed the crisis in terms compatible with Khrushchev's perception of the status quo. He granted that Khrushchev's demands would consolidate the Soviet position in Central Europe. But he also stressed that whatever the intention, the proposal would severely hurt the West.⁴⁷ The Soviet

44. For a description of this "defensive theory," as he calls it, see John Mander, *Berlin, Hostage for the West* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1962), pp. 103-104. Cf. *The Herald Tribune*, December 2, 1958, p. 22, where Lippman speaks of the Soviets' "dread of another Hungary."

45. Thomas A. Baylis, "The New Economic System," *Survey*, 61 (October 1966), 143.

46. J. M. Mackintosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 205-212, 214.

47. Richard Löwenthal, "The Impossible Defensive," *Encounter*, 17 (November 1961), pp. 22-23; see also Mander, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-109.

proposals, he suggested, would simultaneously strengthen the DDR and shatter the Federal Republic.

The working hypothesis of Khrushchev's Berlin policy used in this study is an adaptation of the Mackintosh and Löwenthal analyses written at the time. By 1958, any power which advocated fundamental changes in Germany confronted a highly structured situation which had developed and hardened over thirteen years. The issues still open for negotiation were now quite marginal. The DDR had developed in the East as an integral part of Moscow's European security zone, and the Federal Republic had developed in close relations with Western Europe and the United States. It was very late in the day to expect Bonn to submit to measures the Soviets proposed for reorienting the entire status quo.

In 1958, Khrushchev seemed unprepared to conclude that he could not make gains with crisis tactics. Given Bonn's alliance with Washington, he had to employ a low-risk strategy. But with the hubris he drew from the Soviet Union's achievement in missiles and rockets and the urgency he sensed for stopping or slowing the NATO program to arm West Germany with nuclear weapons, he was convinced he had to try.

6. *The Role of the DDR*

Pankow's relations with Moscow may help to explain some of the pressures on Khrushchev, pressures which affected the timing of several of his decisions throughout the whole conflict from 1958 until 1962. Ulbricht consolidated his own position within the East German Communist party in 1956 and 1957, using the economic and political disaster of 1953 to rationalize the elimination of his political opposition. He could not consolidate the rule of his party in East Germany until the Western powers legally recognized the regime. Ulbricht always felt more urgency than the Soviet leaders for resolving the Berlin question. West Berlin remained an acute embarrassment, if not denial, of DDR state sovereignty.⁴⁸

48. Donald Zagoria observed: "Throughout the Berlin crisis, Ulbricht's speeches and threats have generally been more blatant than Khrushchev's. While this may be a calculated division of labor, it is also possible that Ulbricht seeks consciously to bring pressure on the Kremlin for a faster and fuller settlement of the crisis than the Russians would like to risk. There can be little doubt, at any rate, that Ulbricht plays his own game and that there are limits

Ulbricht served Khrushchev well during Khrushchev's struggle with Malenkov and Molotov in 1957. He probably convinced Khrushchev of the personal loyalty of the East German party. After the 1956 uprisings in Poland and Hungary, Moscow's and Pankow's international interests converged on the need for long-term stability in Eastern Europe. Ulbricht may have requested Khrushchev to support a drive for international recognition of the DDR. There is some evidence to suggest that Ulbricht made this kind of request earlier in 1958.⁴⁹

On October 27, Ulbricht laid claim to West Berlin in a public address.⁵⁰ He referred to the city as originally "part of the Soviet zone of occupation,"⁵¹ ignoring the occupation protocol of 1944 and "Greater Berlin" as an area of joint four-power administration. As the heir of the Soviet Union in the Soviet zone, he implied that Pankow should exercise sovereignty over West Berlin and the access routes. Whether Ulbricht was more blunt than Khrushchev preferred is not known.

The pressure Ulbricht exerted on Khrushchev contained a Chinese dragon. Analysts differ about whether to date the origin of the Sino-

to the Soviet ability to force him into line." *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (New York: Atheneum, 1964), p. 396. Carola Stern agrees. For a brief history of Moscow-Pankow relations, see *Ulbricht, A Political Biography*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), chapters 5 and 6.

49. The State Department claimed to have information indicating that Ulbricht had petitioned Moscow to reopen the Berlin question. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, sister of Secretary Dulles and an official in the Department's German office, stated in a speech on February 21, 1959:

We know that Ulbricht went to Moscow, we know that he presented a complaint there. We know that as a result of this and various erroneous appraisals within the Kremlin made of the Western alliance . . . that they thought the time came now to challenge what I call basic principles.

Contained in remarks of Representative Henry S. Reuss, *Congressional Record*, March 26, 1959 (mimeograph).

50. *The New York Times*, October 30, 1958, p. 4. He had been dropping hints and making assertions about West Berlin since 1956. Stern, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-186.

51. He made the same claim as the Soviet Military Governor prior to the Berlin blockade in 1948 and might have intended to revive fears of another blockade. For a discussion of Pankow's legal claims, see Peter Alfons Steiniger, "Rechts probleme der Entmilitarisierten Freien Stadt West Berlin," (*Legal Problems of the Demilitarized Free City of West Berlin*). *Probleme des Volkerrechts*, Band 2 (Berlin: Veb Deutscher Zentral Verlag, 1962).

Soviet dispute in 1958 or in 1959.⁵² Zagoria argues that "an incipient Peking-Pankow axis" existed in both 1958 and 1959.⁵³ For example, East Germany expressed more sympathy than the Soviet Union for China's "Great Leap Forward" in that period.

Martin Esslin suggests that some aspects of Pankow's collectivization drive in 1960—"Socialist house communities," "workers meetings" at the end of the factory work day—seem to have been inspired by Chinese practices. High-level East German party and trade officials, including President Grotewohl, visited Peking in 1959 and 1960.⁵⁴

If Zagoria and Esslin are correct, some guidelines for Ulbricht's Kremlin lobbying on Berlin can be discerned from Peking's stated position on international issues at the time. He probably did not espouse the Chinese position, but he may have been able to use it as an alternative appraisal of Moscow's foreign policy opportunities. On New Year's Day, Peking welcomed 1958 as a year of great advance: "Full Steam Ahead," "the east wind prevails over the west wind."⁵⁵ These slogans signaled the audacity with which Mao Tse-tung hoped to act that year, an audacity which strained the Sino-Soviet alliance, even if it did not break it, before year's end. Communist China, not a participant in the Near East and Berlin crises, optimistically appraised the opportunities for the Soviet Union in those crises and its own opportunities in the Taiwan Straits.⁵⁶

The DDR as part of the Soviet camp could not lean very far toward endorsing the Communist Chinese appraisal of the international scene. Ulbricht seems to have admired the spirit of the Chinese revolution and perhaps took heart from the Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's general foreign policy as the criticism increased in volume and intensity in 1960, 1961, and 1962.⁵⁷ The growth of the Sino-Soviet dispute, which burst into public view during the prolonged Berlin crisis, may have enhanced Ulbricht's room for maneuver in Moscow.

52. Halperin, *op. cit.*, chapter 10.

53. Zagoria, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

54. Martin J. Esslin, "East Germany: Peking-Pankow Axis," *The China Quarterly* 3 (July-September 1960), pp. 85-88. The communiqué released by Grotewohl and Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi on January 27, 1959, endorsing the Soviet peace treaty proposal appears in the *Peking Review*, February 3, 1959.

55. Zagoria, pp. 172-173.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-197; *Peking Review*, January 20, 1959, p. 20.

57. Cf. Esslin, *op. cit.*, p. 84.