



CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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*Reform, Repression and
Resistance*

Philip Windsor
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4. CONCLUSIONS

THE first change that is apparent in the history of the Soviet occupation is that, having decided to restore a particular status quo in Eastern Europe, the Soviet government in fact changed it. The situation in the Soviet bloc is now more uncertain, more fraught with contradictory possibilities than any of the 'dangerous' developments in Czechoslovakia could possibly have produced. When the elections to the Polish Praesidium were held in November 1968 Mr Gomulka was forced into an alliance with one of his erstwhile adversaries, Mr Gierek, in order to contain the strength of Messrs Moczar and Strzelecki. It was successful: Mr Moczar remained as before a candidate member of the supreme body, but he was scarcely 'contained'. The new men in the Polish Praesidium are hard to identify with the objectives of the European *détente*, while those members of the government who might have been so understood, like Mr Rapacki, have been forced out of office. Equally, that section of the Polish Party which is dedicated to a genuine economic and social pluralization is likely to provide a focus for criticism and discontent within the organization, and the kind of difficulties which are already endemic will probably come into the open in Warsaw. In East Germany, the results are less apparent, and will probably remain so, so long as Herr Ulbricht is alive. But the consequences of the 'decisive' Soviet action at this stage will certainly have been to stimulate the antagonism between the various members of the uneasy coalition which makes up the East German government. Hungary has shown a cautious sophistication since the invasion itself: the Hungarian press has never attacked Mr Dubcek or his government in the way that was experienced elsewhere—even on 22 August and the succeeding days when Mr Dubcek was the target of the most poisonous campaign in *Pravda*, and the columns of its imitators in the Polish, Bulgarian and East German press. Equally, the Hungarian government has been more at pains to emphasize its willingness to continue with the *détente* in Europe than the other nations; and in general, with experience of 1956 behind it, one might say that it has been more careful to avoid divisions within the

nation than the other two countries. But this does not necessarily mean that the Soviet and Hungarian governments will thereby be able to avoid friction, or that the necessity imposed on Hungary by any such friction would enable the government to keep a united nation behind it. Bulgaria alone seems to have escaped from the general malaise and the increased political risks which have followed upon the Soviet action. And the position of the two states which did not take part is now the most problematic of all. In Rumania, the Soviet Union has undoubtedly scored a short-term success. It has curbed the independence of the Rumanians, it has openly threatened them with force, and it has thereby forced any Rumanian government to think twice in future about the room for manoeuvre that it really has. Mr Ceaucescu is reported to have been confident, before last August, that the Soviet Union would not, in fact, invade Czechoslovakia. The occasion for the last open Soviet intervention in the affairs of another state had been the express withdrawal on the part of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia had repeatedly proclaimed its intention of remaining within the Pact, and doing its utmost to strengthen it. On this reading of the rules, Mr Ceaucescu was, of course, justified, just as Mr Dubcek and his government had been justified. But it is now apparent that the rules have changed, and that no one knows what the new ones are. The price that the Soviet government has paid for its short-term success in Rumania is to stimulate Rumanian nationalism, and so to limit the *domestic* room for manoeuvre of the Rumanian government. Already before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the issue was being raised in the country of how far independence without liberalization could go. Certainly, this was due in part to the Rumanian government's own anxiety to form a little *entente* with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; but conversely, the effect of the invasion will be more likely to foster demands for liberalization in the long term than to suppress them. Liberalization and independence have now been too firmly linked; and that is the doing of the Soviet Union. The case of Yugoslavia deserves special consideration below. But throughout Eastern Europe, it is clear that the Soviet action has created a greater uncertainty about the future development of the

governments and societies there than had existed before. In one or two of these countries—quite apart from the continuing development of the Czechoslovak situation—the possibilities of more critical moments may be reached soon. Crises in any of these states would, equally, occur against a background of strong popular and intellectual sympathy for Czechoslovakia—though how far that would count in any country in the bloc at the moment is almost impossible to foresee.

But Moscow has attempted to take care of such eventualities—and in doing so has changed the *status quo* in Eastern Europe still more fundamentally. It has elaborated the extraordinary doctrine of the Socialist Commonwealth to indicate the limits of dissent, and re-assert its authority throughout the countries concerned.¹⁵ On 26 September, *Pravda* declared: 'No one interferes in the specific measures taken to improve the socialist system in the various socialist countries. The picture changes fundamentally, however, when a danger arises to socialism itself in this or that country. . . . (Socialism) is indivisible, and its defence is the common cause of all communists.' And again 'The peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties certainly do have and should have the freedom to determine the roads of advance for their respective countries. However, none of these decisions should do harm either to socialism in their own country or to the fundamental interests of other socialist countries and of the entire working-class which is striving for socialism.'

That declaration makes nonsense of the doctrine of national roads to socialism, which has been official Soviet policy for the last ten years or more. It threatens, in effect, Soviet intervention against any country which the Soviet Union shall deem to be betraying socialism, or endangering its development. Dangerous implications, as judged by the Soviet Union, are thus in themselves sufficient grounds for intervention. It is also clear ('Socialism is indivisible') that the Soviet Union will feel entitled to intervene whenever it feels that socialism

¹⁵ The doctrine of the Socialist Commonwealth has a curious semantic history. The term seems to have been invented by Professor Lapter in Poland in 1957, to express the aspiration that the countries of Eastern Europe might evolve towards a relation with the Soviet Union comparable with that of the independent countries of the Commonwealth. The Soviet Union has now used it for exactly opposite ends.

is threatened in any one country, not merely when the developments in one country might appear to threaten the interests of another. In other words, the Soviet Union has here appointed itself the official guardian of socialist morality: to seek to learn the rules for international conduct and the limits within which the Soviet state shall feel its interests to be secure is henceforth a waste of time. And finally, the fundamental interests of the Soviet Union itself, or of any other socialist country, are also invoked, and provide yet another cause for intervention. A country might be endeavouring to build up socialism in its own way, and doing so flawlessly: it would be of no avail if the interests of other states in the Socialist Commonwealth are involved. On these grounds, Rumania would be just as liable to Soviet intervention as was Czechoslovakia, since the Rumanian government has frequently declared that its own interests and those of the Soviet Union do not necessarily coincide.

Henceforth, no country in Eastern Europe is to feel safe, unless it slavishly follows the Soviet line on everything. Even that would not be much of a guarantee, unless it suppressed its own interests entirely. Like Caligula, the Soviet rulers have elevated the perpetual uncertainty of the subject into a fundamental principle of government. They have also come very near to restoring Stalin's original doctrine of Socialism in one country: the state interests of the Soviet Union equal the Revolution, and in order not to be counter-revolutionary one must subordinate *everything* to those interests.

The doctrine has been very skimpily reported in Eastern Europe. The press in Czechoslovakia has not treated it as if it were important. The Polish press has not mentioned it at all to date. Other countries have confined themselves to brief reports. On the other hand, Mr Gromyko was at pains to give it the maximum publicity in the United Nations. Is there already a conflict here?

It is still impossible to foresee how far this nonsensical and dangerous principle will be applied in practice. But it is already clear that it will have two major effects. Henceforth, and until this principle is officially abolished, it will be impossible for any state in Western Europe to know how far it can proceed in its relations with any state in Eastern Europe.

At any moment, the development of the most narrowly technical relations may be taken as evidence of counter-revolutionary tendencies, or of implications dangerous for the construction of socialism, or of activity hostile to the interests of another Socialist state. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have both been repeatedly attacked in the columns of *Pravda* in the weeks since the invasion for entering into economic relations with West Germany—though in the case of Czechoslovakia these relations are, and have been, considerably more restricted than those of any other Eastern European country. It is of course clear that other countries do not warrant such attacks at present, because the domestic political context is different. But how, in future, is any Western European state to deal with a country like Hungary, which, trade-dependent as its economy is, will certainly seek to expand its relations with the West, but where the danger inherent in a changing political context at home must raise the level of risk? Conversely, how high a future risk will any of these governments dare to contemplate? If the cautious experiments of the last three or four years already represent too high a risk, what will be left of the idea of *détente* in Europe?

The first consequence of this doctrine, then, is a fundamental uncertainty about the continuing scope of the *détente* in Europe. The second relates to the expansion of the Soviet Union as a world power. The clearest symptoms of this new role are the increasingly close relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab states, the growing role that the Soviet government has been taking in the conduct of the war and/or peace negotiations in the Vietnam war, and the expansion of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean. The future implications of such a re-direction of power and influence are outside the scope of this paper. But one of the main assurances for the *détente* in the past few years was a clear cut division between the power confrontation of the Soviet Union and United States in Europe and their pursuit of their interests elsewhere in the world. In Europe, the level of armaments and of the danger of a world war in the event of any conflict, were extremely high; but, partly as a consequence of that danger, the risks of an actual conflict were very low. In other parts of the world, the risks of a conflict were poten-

tially greater, but the level of risk was lower, and the possibility of mediation more considerable. Now this distinction is in danger of being blurred.

It is here that the case of Yugoslavia is relevant. In 1967, Marshal Tito appeared to share the alarm of the Soviet government that the forces of the counter-revolution were gathering strength, and that a swing to the Right was taking place throughout the world. Partly for this reason, he appeared to welcome the expansion of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean, to counteract the American influence there; particularly so after the Israeli victory in the Six-day War. Now, President Tito appears to believe that he is himself threatened with a Soviet invasion. Whether such fears are substantial or not, the prospect exists that if the Soviet government is engaged on a programme of showing who is boss in Eastern Europe; if at the same time it is expanding its interests and activities in the Mediterranean; and if Soviet power is now in evidence on the coast of Yugoslavia as well as on its northern border, then the situation in South-East Europe is potentially much more dangerous than it was before. Fortunately, it is not yet clear whether Yugoslavia constitutes in Soviet eyes, a part of the Socialist Commonwealth or whether that curious concept applies only to members of the Warsaw Pact; fortunately, too, it is clear that President Johnson's warning to the Soviet government 'not to unleash the dogs of war' was taken seriously. But at the same time, the import of the Soviet declaration, coupled with the permanent threat that Yugoslavia represents to the application of the doctrine elsewhere in Eastern Europe, means that a new ground for conflict between the two super-powers has now arisen. And it has arisen on the borders of their interests in Europe and in the rest of the world.

The combination of these two effects means that the evolution of East-West relations now seems to be entering on a new phase: a phase in which increased Soviet repression in Eastern Europe and decreased opportunities for East-West *détente* are combined with the increased possibilities of Soviet-American conflict on the borders of the Soviet and American systems. It means that for all the *formal* care which the Soviet Union took at the time of the invasion to prevent its effects

from spilling over into relations with the United States and the other Western powers, these effects have inevitably spilled over and that the situation is certainly more fluid and potentially more dangerous than it was last summer.

That does not, however, mean that the situation is dangerous here and now, nor that the counter-measures which have been taken by the Western powers since the Soviet invasion (the calls for the strengthening of NATO, the increased emphasis on Mediterranean fleet readiness, the possibilities of a special European committee in NATO) are necessarily the right ones. To judge of this, it is worth considering Soviet conduct prior to the invasion, and in dealing with its effects, in more detail.

Two somewhat contradictory theses have been argued above. First, that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was prompted by the development of internal divisions in the Soviet system itself, that until these divisions made some kind of action imperative, the signs are that the Soviet government was reluctant to use force, and that its conduct since the invasion has shown rather more awareness of circumstances and the non-military factors in international politics than one might have expected. The implications of that are that there is little in the way of general conclusion that can be drawn from its conduct: that it related to a particular kind of crisis at a particular time, and that it was occasioned by internal considerations at that particular time. This first argument means that the Western powers are dealing with an adversary in a state of considerable internal disarray, and that they cannot be nearly so confident about how to deal with her as they were once, but it also means that they have little reason to fear any return to expansionism, or to cold war policies on the part of the Soviet government itself. But the second argument implies more caution. It is that since the invasion the Soviet government has become increasingly arbitrary and authoritarian in Eastern Europe, that in consequence the prospects of *détente* in Europe are very much dimmer than they were, and that the risk of conflicts on the borders of the European and world systems has increased. The implications of this argument are that certain conclusions *are* to be drawn from the Soviet behaviour, and

that one of them might be that increased military wariness is necessary.

It is the contention here that both these arguments are valid. The first relates to the motives and pattern of behaviour of the Soviet government before and during the invasion; the second relates to the ineffectuality of Soviet attempts to deal with the consequences of the invasion. Having created the danger of a series of acute difficulties in their relations with the governments of the Eastern European states, if not of actual crises in the internal development of these states, the Soviet government seemed to have been obliged to go further in laying down the law and threatening force than it seems to have intended at the beginning. The issue of *Pravda* of 26 September may be read as a signal that, having embarked on the use of force, the Soviet Union was not now going to desist. It might be that the very appearance of decisive action created the need for further demonstrations of decision if the Soviet Party itself was still to be sheltered from the immediate effects of the crisis. It might be that the dangers of a chain-reaction in Eastern Europe were more acute than has been publicly apparent, and that some decisive warning was needed to forestall them. Or it might simply be that the Soviet government having been surprised by the resistance of the peoples of Czechoslovakia and by the hopelessness of its attempts to unseat Mr Dubcek, found that it was now dealing with a situation in Czechoslovakia itself and in the rest of Eastern Europe that was very much more complicated than it had expected, and that it made an immediate effort to contain the complications.

But the difficulty has been that, in so doing, it has undone much of the work it had done during the period leading up to the invasion, to separate the consequences in Eastern Europe from the consequences in its relations with the Western world. It has *created* a period of uncertainty.

Granted such an uncertainty, however, it seems imperative to examine the record of Soviet conduct since the invasion, and to try to discern what kind of questions the Western powers should ask about the likely course of Soviet behaviour. It is obvious, first, that the Soviet government was anxious above all not to allow Czechoslovakia to become an occasion

of East-West conflict. (An anxiety which, to its honour, was shared by the government of Czechoslovakia.) Even during the period of pre-invasion build-up, the period of massive and open threats to Czechoslovakia, the Soviet press was anxious to distinguish between the threat to that country itself, and any possible threat to Western Europe. In this it was followed by the press in East Germany and Poland. In a small gem of crisis-communication, it was announced that defence exercises were taking place, and that forces were manoeuvring in the West of the Soviet Union, in Poland, and in the South-Eastern area of East Germany. The only possible reason for any such attempt to distinguish between the South-eastern region of East Germany and the rest of that not very large country was apparently to make it clear that any consequent threat would not be directed Westwards. And at the time of the invasion not only were the Soviet ambassadors sent round to explain the situation to the Western governments, but Mr Kosygin seized the opportunity to invite President Johnson to Moscow to discuss arms control. Moreover, this pattern of conduct has continued. That is, the Soviet government is still anxious to maintain its strategic understanding, and some delimitation of interests in other parts of the world, with the United States. But in Europe, its conduct has changed considerably. It has mounted a new anti-German campaign, of more ferocity than any previous one; it has appeared to make of Britain a particular target of abuse for having protested against the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia; and it has accused NATO of stirring up a war fever at the same time as the Warsaw Pact has itself become subject to an overhaul.

This raises some difficulties of interpretation. It is possible to assume that the Soviet government is still interested in a *détente* with the United States, but that it is not prepared to pay the price for such a *détente* in Europe. It is possible, on the other hand to assume that the differentiation between the United States and the Western European powers is due merely to the fact that it was necessary to make the most of the threat from Germany, and of British hypocrisy in mourning the fate of Czechoslovakia, as part of the effort to hold the Eastern European states in line. In the first case, it would

imply that the Western European nations had some cause for anxiety—that in the foreseeable future, it is possible to imagine a new crisis, perhaps over Berlin, perhaps over Yugoslavia in which their own security would be at stake. In the second case, it would imply that there was really no reason for alarm: that in this matter too the Soviet campaign is directed purely at Eastern Europe, and that while the Western European states might serve as whipping boys, they are never likely to be the subjects of attack. Again, the trouble is that there is some validity in both approaches, since the Soviet action has blurred the differences. It has become plain that the Soviet system can not allow for the effects of *détente* in Eastern Europe (in the way that the system of the United States can allow for a long political vendetta from France) without considering the possibilities, unthinkable in the West, of a fraternal invasion. In that way, it is true that the Soviet Union is simply not prepared to pay the price, in Europe, for a *détente*. It is also true, however, that the attempt to hold down Eastern Europe has willy-nilly involved the West: that having sent round the ambassadors to pay their best respects on the morning of the invasion, the Soviet government now finds it politically expeditious to attack the same governments. But to what extent have the edges been blurred? In other words, how much have the Western European governments to fear? Is there any likelihood of a deliberately engineered crisis the next time that the Soviet government finds that *that* would be politically convenient?

The question is particularly relevant at the present time. It is only just over a year since NATO adopted the criterion of the adversary's *intentions* in judging its own degree of military preparedness, and in doing so it relied heavily on the concept of 'political warning time'. That is, that there would be a long enough period of warning in the political conduct of the Soviet Union and its allies to allow for a high degree of military preparation in the event of a crisis. Such a concept has been called into question by the events in Czechoslovakia. After all, the political warning time was ample in the Soviet-Czechoslovak confrontation; the Soviet government spent several weeks giving massive warning of a possible invasion. But after that it reached a political agree-

ment. And after that it invaded. If the East-West edges have become blurred, therefore, it should now be argued that the most dangerous period in any confrontation with a Russian government is likely to be immediately after a political agreement has been reached: that is, when there is no further question of political warning. In that event, no agreement would be worth having, and NATO's best course would be to maintain as high a degree of tension in Europe as possible. But if the Soviet conduct in Czechoslovakia is not accepted as a guide to its behaviour towards the Western powers, then no lessons in particular are to be drawn from the period between the Cierna meeting and 21 August.

In fact, there appears to be nothing to suggest that the Soviet government is any more willing now, coldly to contemplate an East-West crisis in Europe than it has been at any time since the Berlin wall was built. It might even be possible that the indignation it has directed towards Britain and other European countries might be due as much as anything else to the fact that the Russian government went out of its way to assure them that they were not in danger, and to hurt surprise that a bit of backyard brutality should be thought to be a subject for public comment by the neighbours. In any event, it has done nothing to suggest that its war would go beyond anything but words. Similarly, there is nothing yet to suggest in Eastern Europe that it will do very much to obstruct relations with the Western European states, provided that the domestic political context is right. This second point, is, however, a more arbitrary and changeable one. The conclusion for the present appears to be that there is little likelihood of change in the pattern of relations between the Soviet Union and the Western European states, and little chance of a deliberate crisis. The chances of an unintended crisis have on the other hand gone up since a new uncertainty was injected into the situation in Eastern Europe.

In that case, the questions to which the Western powers should address themselves would appear to be of two kinds. In the first place, what kind of military and political flexibility can be created to deal with any unintended crises (rather than what degree of new strength do they need to deal with

a renewed danger of Soviet expansion)? A series of questions of this nature would involve a reconsideration of what used to be called the Balkans, rather than a reconsideration of strength on the front of the Central Area of NATO. It would also involve a cold assessment of the actual changes produced by an indefinite Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. It is too early to assess this yet, in the light of the continuing uncertainty of the final number of Soviet forces there, of their order of battle, of the morale and fighting potentiality of the Czechoslovak forces, and the changing possibilities and requirements of Intelligence. It is equally no part of the purpose of this paper to examine the outlines of such questions; but it is worth noting that a consensus seems to be emerging that the re-deployment of Soviet forces, taken in conjunction with the virtual elimination for the time being of the Czechoslovak Army as a reliable fighting force¹⁶ has certainly not strengthened the Soviet capability in Europe and might actually have weakened it. Equally, there still seems to be little reason to doubt the general validity of the concept of warning-time in the political relations between the two halves of Europe. The second kind of question that deserves further consideration is the nature of the interaction between the Eastern and Western states of Europe. It is no longer possible to assume (if it ever was) that *détente* is all of a piece, and that any kind of policy which encourages a greater independence in the Eastern European states, or a greater interdependence between the two halves of Europe, is necessarily in the interests of those states themselves or of the Western powers. The desire for independence will be there in any case. The question is not whether to encourage it, but how to treat with the Eastern European states, so that some genuine independence is achieved and preserved, rather than all of it threatened. Such a series of questions might entail a more radical examination of policies in the Western states than has been assumed hitherto. At first sight, that would seem paradoxical in view of the fact that the actual potentialities of action seem rather to have been foreclosed than opened up by the Soviet invasion and its aftermath. But it might also

¹⁶ Though there is nothing to suggest that the Czechoslovak Army would be ineffective in a defensive role.

be true that in the new circumstances, very little can be attempted unless much is attempted. But such a course, if it were not to aggravate the endemic crisis in Eastern Europe could also entail the giving of certain assurances to the Soviet Union. It might be worth asking, for example, for how long it is in the genuine interests of the Western or Eastern states of Europe to withhold recognition of East Germany, when it is clear first that the Soviet Union will never abandon East Germany, and second that a *détente* which the Soviet Union interprets as being against its own interests will probably not get very far or mean very much.¹⁷

A combination of military flexibility (which presupposes a certain political agreement) and radical political re-thinking does not sound the most realistic of prescriptions. Fortunately, I am concerned only with the interpretation of some recent history in Europe, and with the raising of some consequent questions. But there is a third area of consideration, which complicates the questions still further. That concerns the divisions inside the Soviet Union. It is also, primarily, a matter for the United States.

But it is also in the interests of all the Western powers to encourage the more flexible, modern and undogmatic forces in the Soviet leadership. And such an interest creates an acute dilemma. It is necessary to choose between a course of action which demonstrates to the 'hawks' that they cannot behave in the way that they have, and expect no unpleasant consequences, and a course of policy which will show the 'doves' that it is still worthwhile seeking and working for agreements with the United States. Either course involves a risk. If one adopts the second and ignores the first, one runs the risk of strengthening the hand of the most inflexible, the most brutal and the most dogmatic by allowing them to argue that they have shown the iron fist in the East and the West has not reacted. In such a context, they could argue that they regained control in the East and lost nothing in the West. They would be wrong, if only because it is impossible

¹⁷ In an interesting article published after this study had been written, Professor Richard Löwenthal argued that the German question was central to Soviet considerations in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. See *Encounter* (London), January 1969.

to foresee the consequences of what has happened; but in the short term they might sound convincing. But, on the other hand, if one adopts the first and ignores the second, one might also risk strengthening these same men by making it more difficult for their opponents to point to any benefits that could be expected in the short term from an understanding with the United States. Equally, in Europe, the first course of action would risk an increasing repression in Eastern Europe, a growing estrangement of the two halves of the continent, and a virtual end to the hopes of the *détente* of recent years. But the second course of action could risk an increasing disillusion on the part of the Western European states with a United States that appeared more concerned to mend its fences with the Russians than to assure the security of Europe, *plus* an increasing estrangement of the two halves of Europe.

Between such unsymmetrical risks, it is difficult to make decisions of principle. It is rather a matter of timing action. One might argue, for instance, that the timing of discussions between the two super-powers on anti-ballistic missiles and the arms race that might follow from them should depend less on the emergence of a new government in the United States, than on the balance of forces that it is possible to discern within the Kremlin.

These three areas of consideration are almost irreconcilable; each in any case complicates the other two. The complexity which is still more characteristic of the new situation in Europe than it was of the old, does, however, impose the need for a greater co-ordination of action than was apparent before last August. Since President Johnson's 'Peaceful engagement' speech of October 1966, it had become increasingly apparent that any attempt at concerted policies, between the Eastern and Western powers, and among the Western powers themselves, was unlikely to succeed. In the intervening period it had become the custom in the Atlantic Alliance for the principal European powers, as well as the United States, to pursue a series of separate, loosely related *Ostpolitik*s. Certain attempts were made to overcome the difficulties inherent in this mode of policy by using institutional means of co-ordination: by using NATO, for example,

as a forum for an exchange of information and views. To combine some of the policies which might emerge from detailed consideration of the questions raised above would demand more complex consultation and perhaps organization. Whether this occurs in an institutional framework or through more traditional forms of governmental exchange is a secondary matter; but it is clear that the old pattern would not be adequate for more generally co-ordinated policies, whose success would depend to a large extent on their timing, and whose general tendencies could not be presumed to be favoured any longer by an underlying uniformity in the politics of the Eastern bloc. Whatever happens in Europe, the strategic *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to continue; but if the *détente* in Europe is to be salvaged, a more internationalist approach might be necessary.

The European *détente* is still worth salvaging, in fact it is astonishing how strong the will to do it has proved. Far from provoking a strong Right-wing reaction in Germany, as might have been reasonably expected, the Soviet action last August seems actually to have weakened the NDP. Certain Eastern governments have given clear, if indirect notice that within the limits imposed by the Socialist Commonwealth, they intend to continue their previous policies. And the changes which brought about the crisis of Czechoslovakia have certainly not been stopped. In August, it appeared that the Soviet Union had crushed what was perhaps the most significant, certainly the noblest and most hopeful revolution in the affairs of Europe since the war; in fact the Czechoslovak experiment has still not ended. The question that remains is whether the continuing changes will lead to further *détente* or more crises.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: INVASION AND RESISTANCE

by

Adam Roberts